Stereotypes-as-context in visual change detection tasks by Martins, João David
  
 
 
 
 
STEREOTYPES-AS-CONTEXT IN VISUAL  
CHANGE DETECTION TASKS 
 
JOÃO DAVID MARTINS 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation Advisor: 
Professor Teresa Garcia-Marques, Ph.D. 
 
 
Dissertation Seminar Coordinator: 
Professor Teresa Garcia-Marques, Ph.D. 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted as Partial Requirement for the Degree of: 
MASTER IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Specialization in Social and Organizational Psychology 
 
2018 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master's dissertation conducted under the orientation of 
Professor Teresa Garcia-Marques, Ph.D., presented at 
ISPA - University Institute for the degree of Master in the 
specialty of Social and Organizational Psychology. 
  
III 
 
Acknowledgments  
 
Developing this dissertation was what it ideally is supposed to be: a very stimulating period 
of learning new things, acquiring valuable skills, and engaging in discussions with others whose 
reasoning I admire. Contrary to common discourse regarding dissertations, this was truly a fun 
experience. And while learning is always of itself fun and exciting, such a positive overall 
experience is only possible in the company of excellent individuals, to whom I owe the utmost 
gratitude. 
To my advisor, Professor Teresa Garcia-Marques, for sharing vital knowledge that 
significantly enriched this project; for continued support and availability, while, simultaneously, 
encouraging autonomy and self-reliance; but most of all, for the unfailing example of curiosity, 
persistence, rigor, and research ethics. 
To my internship advisor, Professor Rui Bártolo-Ribeiro, for understanding the personal 
significance of this project, and providing every condition necessary for me to make it a priority. 
Other teachers have also, throughout my years in ISPA, contributed to the success of this 
experience, to get to where I am now, and to where I want to be in the future. Namely, Professor 
Maria João Gouveia, whose classes were lessons in critical thinking and enthusiasm for science; 
and Professor Bruno Soares Rodrigues, who sparked my interest for, and enjoyment of, statistical 
methods – something that, I am told, is not easy to convince students of. 
To my boss, Carlos Sousa, who provided all the flexibility possible in the workplace, 
allowing me to dedicate my time and attention to academic pursuits, sometimes at the cost of his 
own time and efforts. 
I would like to show my appreciation for the developers of Google’s algorithms, namely in 
the form of Google Scholar, for organizing the vastness of the internet and saving me incalculable 
hours, while simultaneously giving me a sincere appreciation of all scholars before me who did 
their amazing work before the advent of the digital age and its conveniences. 
Finally, thank you to those who are closest to me, for remaining close to me when all I 
could think and talk about was this dissertation. I understand now that ANOVAs are not as exciting 
to you as they are to me. Sorry.  
 
 
  
IV 
 
Resumo 
 
Processos de identificação e de detecção visual demonstram diferente sensibilidade às 
características do contexto. No primeiro caso, estímulos congruentes com o contexto são 
identificados mais rapidamente do que os incongruentes; no segundo, a incongruência é detectada 
mais rapidamente. Em qualquer dos casos é clara a influência das expectativas criadas pelo 
contexto. 
Estudos que usam estereótipos enquanto contexto também observam identificação mais 
rápida para estímulos congruentes com o contexto. Mas pouco se sabe sobre os efeitos deste tipo 
de contexto em tarefas de detecção. Para testar este efeito utilizou-se uma flicker task na qual 72 
participantes detectaram a mudança de um objecto em cenas naturais contendo uma mulher ou 
homem. O objecto, estímulo crítico, foi congruente (e.g., homem-charuto) ou incongruente com a 
pessoa (e.g., mulher-gravata). Esperava-se diferenças entre estímulos congruentes e incongruentes, 
com detecções mais rápidas de estímulos incongruentes quando comparados com congruentes. Os 
resultados mostram que o nível de congruência não tem impacto na velocidade de detecção. Esta 
foi apenas afectada pelo tempo decorrido entre o início de cada trial e a ocorrência de mudança 
(threshold): em trials em que esta ocorre aos 1200ms, a detecção é significativamente mais lenta 
do que quando ocorre aos 400ms ou 800ms.  
Discutem-se estes resultados à luz da literatura sobre detecção de mudança e estereótipos, 
focando problemas metodológicos da tarefa e a possibilidade de que estereótipos possam 
influenciar tarefas de identificação e detecção diferentemente. O efeito de threshold é discutido à 
luz de uma mudança de estratégia, de procura global e geral, para localizada.   
 
Palavras-chave: estereótipos, percepção, detecção, flicker task 
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Abstract 
 
Visual identification and detection processes show different sensitivity to the same context 
characteristics. In one case, context-congruent stimuli seem to be identified faster than incongruent 
stimuli; conversely, incongruency is detected faster than congruency. In both cases, the influence 
of expectations created from context is clear.  
Studies that use stereotypes as context have also shown that stereotype-congruent stimuli 
are identified faster. But little is known regarding the effect of these contexts in detection tasks. To 
test this effect, a flicker task was used in which 72 participants detected a changing object in natural 
scenes containing either a woman or a man. The object, the critical stimulus, was either 
stereotypically congruent (e.g., man-cigar) or incongruent (e.g., woman-tie). We expected 
differences between congruent and incongruent stimuli, such that changes in incongruent stimuli 
would be detected fast than changes in congruent stimuli. Results show that level of congruency 
did not impact detection speed. Performance was only affected by time between the start of a trial 
and occurrence of change (threshold): in trials when change happens at 1200ms, detection is 
significantly slower than in trials when it happens at 400ms or 800ms.  
We discuss these results within the body of knowledge concerning change detection and 
stereotypes, focusing both on methodologic problems with the task and the possibility that 
stereotypes might influence detection and identification tasks differently. The observed threshold 
effect is discussed within the framework of a change of strategy, between a gist-based global visual 
search, and local search.  
 
Keywords: stereotypes, perception, detection, flicker task  
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Introduction 
 
Change detection, or its counterpart and more popular term change blindness, is a part of 
our everyday experience. Both detecting and missing a change in a visual scene are part of the 
regular working of our cognitive processing: some changes are important to detect (e.g., an unusual 
spot on an x-ray), while others, in the name of cognitive efficiency, are adequately kept under our 
radar (e.g., ads on a website). This awareness that some changes are important and should be 
noticed allowed the phenomenon of change blindness to grow out of the field of research into the 
public’s eye (with popular YouTube videos confirming this popularity) and even government 
policy – namely, the UK Government’s Transport For London, who recreated a famous paradigm 
(Simons & Chabris, 1999) in a video aimed at alerting London drivers that yes, the “I didn’t see 
the cyclist” report is literal, and that attention needs to be directed at that often unnoticed change.  
On the road, change blindness is, then, a matter of public safety. It is also common 
knowledge that, while driving, reaction times are critical, often marking the difference between 
light, serious, or deadly outcomes of an accident. As such, research that uncovers the conditions in 
which these reaction times fluctuate is a must-have basis for any informed and effective 
intervention or policy aimed at reducing the negative outcomes of change blindness. Such 
interventions are aimed at people, and will likely opt for stimuli containing people – something we 
are naturally drawn to (Bracco & Chiorri, 2009). Thus, considering the complex ways in which we 
tend to represent social reality, it is surprising that no previous research has focused on this type of 
stimuli. 
The study presented in this paper aims, then, to explore and clarify how stereotypes 
influence stimuli detection in a change blindness paradigm. It builds upon previous research, in 
which two main findings have been reported: a) activating stereotypes facilitates identification of 
stereotype-congruent stimuli; b) in detection tasks, object-context incongruency facilitates 
detection. In the sense that the first refers to an identification task with stereotype activation, and 
the second is a change blindness detection task with no stereotypical context, these findings may 
be reporting two different psychological mechanisms that, although promoting opposite effects, do 
not necessarily conflict. Thus, the question here addressed: will stereotypes-as-context benefit a 
stereotype-congruent or a stereotype-incongruent stimulus in a detection task?  
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Change Blindness 
Change blindness has been repeatedly defined as the difficulty in detecting changes in a 
visual scene – even those considered large or substantial (Simons, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005). 
Visual changes occur under many forms, some of which have been demonstrated in a laboratory 
environment – from eye saccades to blinking, jump cuts in video, alternating screens (for a review, 
see Simons & Levin, 1997) – and some in real-life scenarios, where half of the participants fail to 
notice when the person they were interacting with is replaced by another actor (Simons & Levin, 
1998). 
Simons and Levin's review (1997) underlines a crucial aspect of the change blindness 
phenomenon: the role of expectations. Because our encoding of visual scenes is not verbatim 
(instead, an abstraction), expectations would lead to better performance in change detection for 
“schema-inconsistent objects than the schema-consistent ones” (p. 264).   
More recently, LaPointe, Lupianez, and Milliken (2013) have emphasized the same effect, 
as well as its reversal: in detection tasks, context-incongruent targets are detected faster; in 
identification tasks, it is the context-congruent targets that are benefited. They proposed a dual 
process account of these effects: on one hand, a congruency benefit in identification tasks, in which 
prior knowledge, expertise, and scene schematics play a role; on the other hand, incongruency 
benefits in detection tasks depend on attention capture processes (ACPs), which are sensitive to 
target-context inconsistencies (see also LaPointe & Milliken, 2016, 2017).  
 
Figure 1. Dual process account of congruency and incongruency benefits, in 
identification and detection tasks (LaPointe et al., 2013) 
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This dual process proposal converges with findings that detection and identification tasks 
rely on different perceptual and neural processes (Busch, Fründ, & Herrmann, 2010; Lyyra, 
Wikgren, & Astikainen, 2010) and distinct cortical mechanisms (Straube & Fahle, 2011). 
 
Stereotypes and stereotype effects 
Picking up on Simons and Levin's (1997) mention of schemas, one can ask: would these 
congruency- and incongruency-benefits also be observed if the context in which the target stimuli 
changes contained stereotype-relevant information (i.e., aspects that lead to stereotype activation)? 
Stereotypes, while defined as structured sets of beliefs and expectations regarding social groups 
and their members (for a comprehensive definition, see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), can be 
paralleled to schemas – both being adaptive and “well-rehearsed, automatically activated cognitive 
structures” (Cox, Abramson, Devine, & Hollon, 2012, p. 429). As such, stereotypes would act as 
energy-saving devices, allowing for a more economical and efficient cognition. These were, in fact, 
the findings of a study by Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994): stereotypes allow for less 
resource-intensive processing, with stereotype-consistent traits being recalled at a higher rate for 
subjects previously exposed to a matching stereotypic label. In other words, authors observed an 
expectancy-congruency benefit, both at the conscious and subliminal level. 
Recall that stereotypes have a pervasive and diversified influence in our everyday lives, 
from mediatic race discrimination to academic performance (Cadinu, Maass, Frigerio, Impagliazzo 
& Latinotti, 2013). With particular relevance to this study, stereotypes have been shown to have 
subtle and implicit effects on perception, and visual processing (e.g. Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & 
Davies, 2004; Stone, Perry, & Darley, 1997). In short, we know that activating stereotypes 
influences subsequent processing (e.g., facilitating stimuli identification, differentiated response 
for congruency and incongruency).  
Given this review, and having established that stereotypes can be equated with schemas, 
we reason that stereotypes can also have a measurable effect on change detection and identification 
tasks. 
While the stereotype-focused studies mentioned above weren’t centered on change 
blindness tasks (or any variation of such), two lines of research regarding identification are worth 
mentioning. 
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First, research developed within Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink's (2002) “Police 
Officer’s Dilemma” task: a shoot/don’t shoot computerized decision task in which targets (African 
American vs. White) would appear in a naturalistic background, holding either a weapon or 
common objects (e.g., cell phone, soda cans, etc.) Participants are instructed to “shoot” when the 
target is holding a gun, and to press “don’t shoot” when they are holding anything else – they have 
under a second to decide. Notice that race or ethnicity are not relevant to perform this task. The set 
of studies developed with this task are based on the contents of the African American stereotype, 
which is associated with violence and danger, and this stereotypic schema is assumed to interfere 
with the task, biasing identification in favor of stereotype-congruent targets. Results support this 
interpretation: participants shoot an armed target faster when African American (vs. White) and 
chose not to shoot an unarmed target faster when White (vs. African American). Error rates show 
the same tendency. 
A second relevant line of research was developed within Payne's (2001) weapon 
identification task, in which participants, along several trials, have to quickly identify either a gun 
or a tool, after being primed with black or white faces. Much like in Correll et al. (2002), both the 
analysis of reaction times and accuracy suggested a stereotype-congruency benefit.  
These studies are relevant to our goal because a) they use stereotypes as context; and b) 
they apply variants of an identification task. In short, they suggest that: much like non-stereotypical 
schemas benefit the identification of schema-congruent stimuli, stereotypes also benefit the 
identification of stereotype-congruent stimuli. While these studies present priming, associative 
networks, and concept activation as mechanisms on which perception may rely in order to benefit 
context-congruent targets, they follow an identification paradigm.  
 
Present study 
Our remaining question is if the incongruency-benefit observed in detection tasks can also 
be observed when stereotypes (or stereotype activating stimulus) are the context.  
Regarding change detection and identification, the literature reviewed above (and more 
thoroughly in Appendix A) establishes that: 
 
• In identification tasks, performance is benefited for context-congruent targets, by means 
of prior knowledge, expertise, gist-based scene schematics;  
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• In detection tasks, performance is benefited for context-incongruent targets, by means 
of attention capture processes, sensitive to context-target inconsistencies. 
Regarding stereotypes, however, literature tells us that: 
• Identification of stereotype-congruent targets is also facilitated, with faster response 
and lower error rates; 
 
Detection (with stereotypes as context) is hypothesized to, not unlike change blindness, 
mobilize attention processes that benefit incongruity. This is, in fact, one of the advantages of 
relying on schemas on our cognition: the quick detection of the unexpected, that which violates 
assumptions and expectations, and most likely needs our attention. If stereotypes can be equated to 
other schemas, incongruency should also be benefited in a detection task.  
This will be tested in a computerized flicker task (Simons, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005, 
p. 16), in which “an original and modified scene alternate repeatedly, separated by a brief blank 
display, until observers find the change”. Trials will either be congruent (e.g., a man figures in the 
context, and the target is an object highly associated with men, such as a cigar) or incongruent (e.g., 
a man figures in the background, and the target is lipstick).  
Every trial was categorized according to three main variables, for which reaction times 
(henceforth RT) were calculated: 
 
a) Stereotype: whether the person present in the scene was a woman or a man; 
b) Object: determines whether the object that appeared (i.e. the change) was categorized 
in pre-test as male or female; 
c) Threshold: the time at which the change occurs, varying between 400, 800, or 1200ms. 
 
Congruency is defined as the interaction of stereotype and object gender. 
To test our hypothesis, that stereotype-object congruency will impact detection 
performance as expressed in differing RTs, a flicker task was adapted from Rensink, O’Regan, and 
Clark (1997). This paradigm, being the most widely used in literature on the topic, has been tested 
by multiple independent researchers, allowing for replications, comparability of results, and overall 
convergence of evidence.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
A sample of 74 first and second-year undergraduate students (56 women, 16 men) with 
ages between 18 and 51 (M = 23, SD = 7.8) was recruited in exchange for credit in two courses at 
ISPA – University Institute, in Lisbon, Portugal. Sample size was determined in power analysis, 
using the software G*Power (a priori computation for a repeated measures ANOVA within factors; 
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). As effect sizes in social psychology usually vary between 
small and medium (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003), a conservative effect size was selected 
in the computation. For ηp2 = 0.1, a required sample size was 73 participants. 
 
Design 
The design is a 2 (Stereotype: Woman vs. Man) x 2 (Object gender: Female vs. Male) x 3 
(Threshold: 400ms vs. 800ms vs. 1200ms) design, with all three measures being within-subjects.  
 
Materials 
Photographs of objects used in this study were pre-tested (N= 33; 23 female; age = 35,55; 
SD = 13,39) to ensure their stereotypic fit vs. no fit to Male and Female gender stereotype (see 
Appendix B). These objects were then superimposed in a photograph of a natural environment. 
Objects were shown along with a person of the same or different gender from that with which it 
was matched in the pre-test, hence creating congruent and incongruent trials. To make sure that 
congruency levels varied only regarding stereotype, the environments were carefully selected so 
that: a) both a woman and a man could naturally be found in each scene; and b) objects were also 
naturally found in each scene (e.g., both a woman, a man, a dress, and a tie can be found in a 
bedroom). 
Photos for nine scenes were taken purposely for the study, using a Sony Alpha6000 camera, 
edited with Adobe Lightroom CC, and composed in Adobe Photoshop CC for Windows. For the 
remaining scenes, images were obtained online, through a Google Image search, filtering for 
copyright-free images only. Finally, pictures of objects were either photographed specifically for 
the study, taken from Javadi and Wee (2012; used with permission), or through a Google Image 
search, filtering for copyright free images only. All scenes are listed in Appendix C) 
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From these materials, a total of 72 photographs were used in critical trials – 12 scenes, each 
with 6 conditions: 2 (stereotype: woman vs. man) x 3 (no object; congruent; incongruent). 
 
Procedure 
Participants arrived in groups in the laboratory and were welcomed. They were briefed by 
the experimenter about the general purpose of the experiment and were reminded of the importance 
of not only their contribution, but also of performing the task with attention. An experimenter was 
present to answer any question. Afterwards, participants were seated on individual booths and 
presented with on-screen instructions (see Appendix D). 
The task follows the flicker task structure, illustrated in Figure 3 below. For each trial, a 
fixation crosshair is initially presented for 500ms, followed by an image of a woman or man in a 
naturalistic scene (200ms). Afterwards, the screen is blank for 200ms, followed by the same image 
with the critical object (200ms). A blank screen is once more presented for 200ms, thus ending the 
cycle. This cycle is repeated 19 times or stops when participants detect the change. In both cases, 
the task advances to the next trial. 
To detect random responding, three conditions were created, varying in how many times 
the first image (A) is shown before the altered image (B). The cycle depicted in Figure 3 shows the 
400ms threshold condition, with a single presentation of A before the change occurs. The 800ms 
condition has two presentations of A, and the 1200ms condition has three presentations of A 
(always followed by a blank screen). RTs were measured from the moment the change was 
introduced. 
Figure 2. Example of a scene; man-congruent condition on the left, and woman-congruent condition on the right. 
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Participants were instructed to press SPACEBAR if they detected a change. Instructions 
clearly indicated detection. 
In each scene, the changing object was superimposed in the same location. To avoid a 
learning effect, critical trials were interspersed with lures – trials using the same scene, with 
changes occurring at different locations, with new non-critical objects or a different category of 
change (e.g., disappearing light switch; changing the color of an object).  
Upon completion of 48 trials, participants were thanked for their contribution.  
 
 
  
Figure 3. Flicker task, specifically the 400ms condition 
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Results 
 
The main goal of this study was to test if congruency between the gender of a changing 
object and an exemplar of the gender stereotype in the background would interfere with the speed 
at which participants detected the change in a visual task. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed 
participant RTs for each stereotype, object gender, and threshold, as within-participant factors of 
an ANOVA with the following design: 2 (woman vs. man) x 2 (female vs. male) x 3 (400ms, 
800ms, 1200ms).   
 
RT analysis 
 
Contrary to expectations, no effect for congruency was found, as determined by a non-
significant interaction between stereotype and object gender (F (1,71) = .519, p = .474, ηp2 = .007). 
Main effects were however detected for: object gender (F (1,71) = 10.669, p = .002, ηp2 = .131), 
with objects associated with women being detected faster (M = 1103.04, SD = 39.97) than those 
associated with men (M = 1243.16, SD = 45.45); and for threshold (F (2,142) = 24.431, p = .000, 
ηp2 = .256), which also interacted with other factors, as detailed below. 
Figure 4. Participant's change detection RTs (ANOVA Stereotype x Object gender x Threshold); * and 
+ indicate significant differences. 
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Figure 5 shows trials with a threshold of 400ms registering significantly lower reaction 
times when compared to trials with thresholds of 800ms and 1200ms (Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test, 
p < .05). 
 
A significant interaction between object gender and threshold was also observed. This 
effect varied according to threshold level (F (2, 142) = 2.999, p = .053, ηp2 = .041; Figure 6), with 
significant differences only at the extremes: 400ms (Mfemale = 816.39, SDfemale = 37.13 vs. Mmale = 
1053.8, SDmale = 60.21) and 1200ms (Mfemale = 1213.57, SDfemale = 63.46 vs. Mmale = 1413.38, SDmale 
= 77.51). 
A significant interaction between stereotype and threshold was also observed (F (2, 142) = 
3.743, p = .026, ηp2 = .05). At 800ms, trials figuring a man (M = 1193.79, SD = 56.31) were detected 
significantly faster than those with a woman (M = 1347.67, SD = 81.01; Fisher’s LSD, p = .039). 
Figure 5. Participant RTs for the three threshold levels 
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In short, we observe that: 
a) when change occurs at 400ms and 1200ms, there is a benefit (in the form of lower 
RTs) for trials containing a female object, regardless of stereotype; 
b) when change occurs at 800ms, RTs are lower for trials depicting a man, regardless 
of object.  
 
These results suggest that differences in detection RTs are not, as expected, due to cognitive 
processes in which congruency would be considered. Unexpectedly, we found interesting effects 
of threshold and object gender tied to the materials used to represent the specific object and 
stereotypes. To obtain a better understanding of the object gender effect, we advance two 
possibilities that can be addressed with our current data. 
The first hypothesis is that the effect is driven by motivational factors. Female and male 
participants may have been differently motivated to attend to stimuli associated with their own 
gender. Since most of our participants were women, it is possible that they have higher familiarity 
with objects typically associated with women than with those associated with men.  
Figure 6. RTs for different object genders by threshold level (ANOVA Object gender vs. Threshold) 
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Our second hypothesis relates to the perceptive features of the materials used, which could 
lead to an attention preference benefiting female objects differently from male objects, as well as 
for the preference for images featuring a man (vs. those featuring a woman) observed in trials with 
a threshold of 800ms.   
Both these post-hoc hypotheses are detailed below, addressing the effects of both object 
gender and stereotype. Since each level of object gender and stereotype was counterbalanced 
between each level of threshold, the main effect of threshold is not addressed. 
 
Motivational hypothesis 
To test for an effect of a match between participant gender and object gender, the former 
would have to be introduced as a factor in our previous analysis. Such analysis is not possible due 
to the uneven distribution of gender in our sample. As such, we performed separate analyses for 
each gender, keeping in mind that only the female sample analysis has enough power to support a 
conclusion. 
 
Female sample analysis (n = 55) 
A 2 (stereotype) x 2 (object gender) x 3 (threshold) ANOVA for female participants’ RTs 
was conducted; replicating previous analyses, no congruency effect, as defined by the interaction 
Figure 7. Female participants' RTs (ANOVA Stereotype x Object gender x Threshold) 
13 
 
between object gender and stereotype, was found (F (1, 54) = .363, p = .549, ηp2 = .007).  
We replicated the effects of object gender (F (1, 54) = 12.195, p = .001, ηp2 = .184), with 
female objects being generally detected faster than male objects (Mfemale = 1061.49, SDfemale = 40.67 
vs. Mmale = 1229.15, SDmale = 53.64), and of threshold (F (2, 108) = 19.319, p = .000, ηp2 = .263), 
with RTs at 400ms (M = 922.005, SD = 44.9) significantly lower than at 800ms (M = 1291.09, SD 
= 61.07) and 1200ms (M = 1222.88, SD = 57.58). 
Like in the previous analysis, an interaction between object gender and threshold was 
found, showing that the difference in RTs for object gender is only significant at the outermost 
levels: 400ms and 1200ms (Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test; p = .002). 
Interestingly, the interaction between stereotype and threshold is not significant, suggesting 
that female participants attend to the person in the background equally throughout all levels of 
threshold.  
 
Male sample analysis (n = 16) 
A 2 (stereotype) x 2 (object gender) x 3 (threshold) ANOVA for male participants’ RTs 
was conducted (F (2, 30) = .366, p < .697, ηp2 = .024). Again, no congruency effect was detected 
(F (2, 30) = .363, p < .556, ηp2 = .024). 
 
Figure 8. Male participant's RTs for all three levels of threshold. 
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Not surprisingly, given the reduced sample size, less significant effects were observed with 
this sample. However, the analysis could be a suggestion that, for this sample, object gender is not 
relevant, as no effect was detected (F (1, 15) = 0.156, p < .698, ηp2 = .01), with a descriptive power 
of 0.06. 
The only main effect that remained significant was that of threshold (F (2, 30) = 15.39, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .506; Figure 8); interactions between threshold and stereotype (F (2, 30) = 2.207, p = 
.128, ηp2 = .129), and threshold and object gender (F (2, 30) = 1.846, p = .175, ηp2 = .110) were 
not significant.  
When analyzing the pattern of means for threshold levels we find that, unlike both the full 
sample and the female-only sample, each level of threshold differed significantly from the others 
(as determined by Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test, p < .05). The longer it took for the change to happen, 
the longer it also took male participants to detect it. 
Taken together, these two analyses are likely suggesting that gender matching may account 
for some of the variability in our data: women attend more to objects matching their gender, and 
men do not. However, while the absence of an object gender effect in the male sample might 
suggest a motivational hypothesis (e.g. familiarity with female objects by a mostly female sample), 
it is important to note that the male sample consists only of 16 participants. 
This analysis may also suggest that motivational differences, if occurring, may focus 
women’s and men’s attention on the object, and not on the person in the picture. In both analysis 
we find no impact of stereotype – neither a direct impact, nor one moderated by threshold. 
 
Perceptive hypothesis 
Aims to understand if specific features or details in our materials can lead to observed 
differences – either promoting effects or interfering with the test of our main hypothesis. 
To accomplish this, we first analyzed how participants responded to each specific scene 
(scenes were counterbalanced between all three levels of threshold). With this goal, average RTs 
were calculated for each of the 12 scenes displayed; subsequent ANOVAs were performed to detect 
any interactions between scene and object gender, and scene and stereotype.  
Attesting to the relevance of the specific photo, main effects were detected for scene (F (11, 
737) = 31.344, p = .000, ηp2 = .319), suggesting that participants took more time to detect changes 
in specific scenes. 
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Additionally, even when analyzing by scene, a main effect of object is detected (F (1, 71) 
= 8.168, p = .006, ηp2 = .103), but no main effect of stereotype was found (F (1, 67) = 0.005, p < 
.946, ηp2 < .001).  
Two interactions with scene were detected and plotted: object gender and scene (F (11, 
781) = 4.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .058), and stereotype and scene (F (11, 737) = 3.203, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.046).  
 
This suggests that only some scenes are responsible for differences found for object gender 
and stereotype. The plots allow us to single out which scenes had significantly different RTs for 
these factors, so that their perceptive features, namely saliency differences, could be analyzed. 
From post-hoc analysis, we have identified scenes 2, 3, and 7 as showing significantly faster 
detection of objects associated with women (Figure 9); on the other hand, scene 3 shows faster 
detection for trials in which a woman is shown, and scene 11 for when a man is shown (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 9. Participants RTs for Object gender by Scene. Asterisks indicate significant differences 
(Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test, with p < .05). 
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Saliency analysis 
In order to understand if object gender and/or person in the set of photos have different 
perceptive features that could promote differences in these factors, we analyzed the salience of the 
images from scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11 – in total, 16 images (4 scenes x 2 object gender x 2 stereotype) 
– using the SUN model (Zhang, Tong, Marks, Shan, & Cottrell, 2008). 
Saliency, to define it briefly (for a more thorough definition, see Appendix A), is that which 
makes a stimulus attract our gaze or fixation, standing out from other stimuli with which it 
competes for our attention. It is not an exclusive characteristic of the environment itself, instead 
depending simultaneously on the observer. In short, something is salient when it implies 
“biological significance” (Harris & Jenkin, 2001, p. 8), and stimuli characteristics (e.g., orientation 
and color) can play a part in setting it apart from its context.  
Because of this, differences in saliency are relevant in the sense that object (female vs. 
male) and person (woman vs. man) were changed. These might have introduced new saliency 
values, altering how salient certain areas of the image are in relation to the rest of the image (i.e., 
how they compete for our gaze and attention).  
The SUN model outputs saliency maps – images in which each pixel is colored according 
to predicted bottom-up saliency, in relation to the rest of the image. As it uses MATLAB’s imagesc 
Figure 10. Participants RTs for Stereotype by Scene. Asterisks indicate significant differences 
(Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test, with p < .05). 
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function, each saliency map is normalized: the most salient pixel in the image is always shown 
with the brightest yellow; similarly, the darkest blue is always attributed to the pixel scoring lowest 
in saliency. If pixels with new lower or new higher saliency scores are introduced (i.e., increasing 
saliency amplitude), the rest of the pixels will be colored according to that new amplitude.  
Analysis is, from here onwards, qualitative, by interpreting the saliency maps on the 
following page (Figure 11). 
 
Object gender  
A significant difference for object gender was detected in scenes 2, 3, and 7. Saliency maps 
for these scenes (Figure 11) show that changing the object can influence the overall saliency of the 
background, making certain regions of the image more, or less, salient. This could, in turn, make 
the object easier or harder to detect.  
For instance, in scene 3, two aspects can be noted:  
 
a) the female object (left side) has higher saliency in relation to the background, while 
the male object (on the right) shows levels of saliency (in yellow) that are similar in 
intensity to the background (i.e., unlike the female object, both male object and its 
surrounding background show similar color);  
b) the introduction of the female object lowers brightness on other areas of the image 
(e.g., bedframe or top of wardrobe) – this indicates that the female object becomes 
the most salient aspect of the image, with saliency scores that fall outside the range 
of saliencies (i.e., higher) for the image with the male object.  
 
In short, the female object is, in relation to the rest of its image, more salient than the male 
object is. This difference in saliency could render it easier to detect. 
In scenes 2 and 7, there is no visible difference in the saliency of the background when the 
object is changed. Differences in RTs for object gender may result from different saliency scores 
for object themselves, and the area surrounding them. Saliency scores are calculated by averaging 
each pixel’s individual score – which, in turn, is the algorithm’s prediction of how it will attract 
“human fixation when free-viewing images” (Zhang et al., 2008, p. 2).  
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Figure 11. Saliency maps for scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11. Red circles mark object location 
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In scene 2, for example, these scores were calculated for the region containing the object 
and its immediate surrounding. The male object score was 160.002 while the female object scored 
184.57. This higher salience of the female object could account for its faster detection, regardless 
of stereotypic context. 
As for scene 7, the female object (women’s shoes, on the left) is visibly more salient than 
the male object, as evidenced by its brighter yellow color. In other words, the female object is 
higher in the ranking of saliency in its own image than the male object is (the blue shades of the 
men’s shoes’ pixels match the background’s color more closely, meaning it stands out less). This 
can lead to facilitated detections of the female object. 
This analysis tells us, then, that there are aspects of the materials that promote differences 
in object gender, towards a faster detection of objects associated with the female gender. 
 
Stereotype 
As seen above, the different objects in scene 3 also alter the salience of other areas of the 
image – namely, the person. For both man and woman conditions, the area of the image containing 
the person is more salient when the male object is present. However, this happens differently: 
looking at the male object only, the woman’s pixels have brighter yellow tones when compared to 
the man’s – in order words, predicted by the algorithm to attract fixation more often.  
In scene 11 the difference in salience is noticeable between man and women, instead of the 
object itself: the man’s face is brighter than the woman’s. In fact, brightness for objects on the right 
side of each image differ: objects are brighter in the woman condition – both the critical object and 
the surrounding objects. On the other hand, in the man condition, the face introduces new higher 
values of saliency, and the objects (including the changing object) are no longer the most salient 
aspect. In other words, for trials with this scene where a man is featured, the saliency ranking of 
the object and its surrounding is decreased when compared to trials with a woman. It is difficult to 
assume, from this analysis of saliency maps, the reason why the man condition registered faster 
detections. One possibility is that the in the woman condition both critical and surrounding objects 
compete for human fixation (i.e., increased noise) – this added information may require increased 
visual processing and slow down detection. 
As demonstrated, scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11 have unique perceptive features that match 
significant differences in RTs for either object gender or stereotype. To rule out the possibility that 
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these images may have introduced noise in our main analysis, trials from scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11 
were removed and the analysis of our hypothesis was repeated.   
 
Re-testing the hypothesis controlling for saliency differences 
To investigate the impact of the materials and any perceptive features that could interfere 
with participants’ performance, scene saliency was analyzed. Scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11 had significant 
differences in RTs between either object gender, or stereotype. Analysis of saliency maps for these 
scenes also showed notable differences between conditions (e.g., female object vs. male object). 
To rule out the perceptive hypothesis for the object gender effect, trials from these four scenes were 
removed, and our main hypothesis analysis was repeated. 
We analyzed participant RTs for each stereotype, object gender, and threshold, as within-
participant factors of an ANOVA with the following design: 2 (woman vs. man) x 2 (female vs. 
male) x 3 (400ms, 800ms, 1200ms).  
Only an effect of threshold was detected (F (2,138) = 37.663, p = .000, ηp2 = .353). No 
other effects were observed. Interestingly, by controlling for these scenes, we find that RTs at 
1200ms were significantly higher than at 400ms and 800ms, as determined by Fisher-s LSD post-
hoc test (p = .000). 
 
Figure 12. RTs for all levels of threshold, after removing scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11. 
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Analysis of threshold effects 
The only consistent effect in our data is that of threshold. What can explain this? 
It should be noted that in the version of the flicker paradigm used here, both images 
(whether with or without the changing object) as well as the blank screens were displayed for 
200ms. As such, it is possible to determine where in the procedure participants detected the change 
(i.e., when an image was shown with the object, without the object, or during a blank screen). 
Adding the average RT and its corresponding threshold gives us the total time from the start of the 
procedure. Figure 16 is a graphical representation of the procedure’s timeline. 
 
  The top layer shows average RTs registered for each threshold level (identified in gray, 
top line). Total RTs are the sum of the observed RT and the threshold level (e.g. 1329 = 929 + 
400). In the bottom part, each red line is associated with a specific threshold, and indicates whether 
detection happened in a blank screen, or an image with or without the changing object. The ruler 
in the middle section distinguishes between an image being presented (number in black), or a blank 
screen (number in gray). 
As such, average RT for threshold levels of 400ms and 800ms land on a picture containing 
the changing object (i.e., the object “appears”); more specifically, average RT for 400ms trials is 
129ms after the object appears, and for 800ms trials is 183ms after the object appears. Average RT 
for a threshold level of 1200ms lands on a blank screen that was preceded by an image without the 
changing object; in other words, at 1200ms trials, the key is pressed 219ms after the object 
disappears.  
To try to understand if the threshold effect was limited to our study and task (e.g., due to 
error), we collected the threshold values used in experiments from other studies, as well as the RTs 
observed. Included are studies that used the flicker paradigm and reported RTs in milliseconds 
(some reported screen cycles, or only show RTs graphically). Some studies reported RTs by 
Figure 13. Timeline (in milliseconds) of the procedure, indicating average RT for each threshold condition. 
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condition (e.g., congruency with background), instead of generally, and that distinction was 
maintained. 
 
Table 1 
Studies using the flicker paradigm, thresholds, and RTs. 
Study Experiment Threshold (ms) RTs (ms) 
Hollingworth and 
Henderson (2000) 
1 330 1261 
330 1190 
Zimmermann, Schnier, 
and Lappe (2010) 
1 320 4500 
LaPointe et al. (2013) 3 500 5126 
LaPointe and Milliken 
(2016) 
– 500 4778 
500 3761 
Ortiz-Tudela, Milliken, 
Botta, LaPointe, and 
Lupiañez (2016) 
1 500 3289 
500 2680 
2 500 3072 
500 2407 
3 500 4018 
500 3691 
LaPointe and Milliken 
(2017) 
1 500 4368 
500 3638 
Vierck and Kiesel 
(2008) 
1 320 8156 
640 8917 
1600 15504 
2 960 11746 
1600 16020 
3 640 8583 
Hollingworth, Schrock, 
and Henderson (2001) 
1 660 2760 
2a 660 2930 
2b 660 5050 
 
There is a significant correlation between thresholds used and the observed RTs (Pearson 
product-moment correlation; r (21) = .86, p = .000). Note that only the study by Vierck and Kiesel 
(2008) employs three different thresholds for the same task, with the same stimuli. It is also the 
only study using relatively high threshold values (namely, 1600ms and 960ms). Removing this 
study from the analysis renders the correlation insignificant (r (21) = .328, p = .199) 
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Discussion 
 
This study aimed to test if congruency between the gender associated with a changing object 
and an exemplar of the gender stereotype in a flashing image would interfere with the speed at 
which participants detected the change in a visual task. As such, we looked for an interaction effect 
between stereotype and object gender (congruency). Such effect was not found.  
An effect of object gender (faster detection for female objects) was observed in the first 
stage of our analysis. Exploring genders separately showed it to be present only in the female 
sample. Scenes in which this effect was significant were identified and their perceptive qualities 
were analyzed with saliency maps. Due to visible discrepancies in saliency between the two object 
conditions, these scenes were removed, and the analysis repeated for the full sample. No effect of 
object gender was detected. 
 Finally, the only significant effect was that of threshold: change detection is significantly 
slower when change occurs at 1200ms. 
 
Congruency 
Throughout every stage of the analysis, no such interaction was observed in our results, 
suggesting that stereotype-object congruency had no impact in change detection performance. A 
few possible explanations can be advanced. 
Reviewing available literature on visual search tasks and the effect of context and 
expectations, particularly when tested in conjunction with stimulus-context congruency or 
including stereotypes, some observations stand out: 
 
a) For identification tasks, a congruency benefit is observed, both with neutral stimuli (e.g. 
a road, university campus, or a zoo; LaPointe, Lupianez, & Milliken, 2013; LaPointe & 
Milliken, 2016, 2017; Ortiz-Tudela, Milliken, Botta, LaPointe, & Lupiañez, 2016), and 
using stereotypes as context (Correll et al., 2002; Payne, 2001) – in short, stereotypes 
acted as other schemas that are abstracted from the image’s background; 
b) For detection tasks, the benefit (i.e., faster detection) is observed for neutral incongruent 
stimuli (experiments 2 and 3 by LaPointe et al., 2013; Ortiz-Tudela et al., 2016). 
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However, no evidence was found on how stereotyped contexts would interact with 
congruency. This gap in the literature is why we approached the issue. 
 
Expecting an interaction (as we hypothesized) contains an assumption that has not been 
verified: that if stereotypes behave similarly to other (neutral) schemas in identification tasks, they 
would also perform similarly for detection tasks. There is a possibility that task type (i.e., 
identification vs. detection) might trigger cognitive mechanisms that impact the processing of 
stereotype-heavy stimuli differently. Stereotypes could operate differently than other schemas in 
detection tasks, while operating similarly in identification tasks. But even when limiting our focus 
to identification tasks, it is not necessary that, cognitively, stereotypes act as other schemas to 
obtain the same result – a different mechanism, acting with stereotypes but not neutral stimuli, 
could also lead to a congruency benefit. In short, similar results do not guarantee similar processes.  
LaPointe and Milliken (2017), when detailing their model, attempt to explain both the 
congruency benefit in identification task, and the incongruency benefit in detection tasks (see 
Figure 1 in the Introduction section). To do so, they suggest different mechanisms for the two tasks: 
identification relies, for example, on prior knowledge and expertise; while detection relies on 
attention capture processes that focus on semantic inconsistency. It is possible to argue that 
stereotypes rely differently on such mechanisms, with heavier dependency on prior knowledge – 
as said by Hilton and Hippel (1996, p. 248) in their text on stereotypes, “prior knowledge 
determines what we see and hear, how we interpret that information, and how we store it for later 
use”. This would explain how stereotypes seem to make a difference in identification tasks, but not 
in detection tasks: stereotypical incongruency might not interact with the attention capture 
processes with the strength that translates to a differential reaction time. 
A second problem stems from differences in method. While studies approaching the impact 
of congruency have adopted the flicker paradigm (also used in this study; Rensink et al. 1997), 
studies involving stereotypes have not. In the case of Payne's study (2001), the task was more a 
traditional priming paradigm than a visual search task: faces were shown in isolation, without any 
background or attempt to make them naturalistic. It is legitimate to ask if different methods might 
be demonstrating, once again, different cognitive processing that just happen to output the same 
result – congruency benefits. As such, the question that follows is: if the same method was applied 
(e.g., the flicker paradigm) to identification tasks with stereotypes, would the same benefit be 
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observed? In other words: under the same method, would stereotypes act as other neutral schemas 
do? Note that this was an assumption that sustained our research question. 
Under this perspective, our results (no effect of congruency) might indicate that with 
stereotype-activating contexts, congruency has no effect on performance in a change detection task. 
However, it might also be indicative that this lack of effect is not dependent on task type – a 
question to be cleared by running a change identification task based on the flicker paradigm, using 
stereotypes as context. 
Concerning the lack of effect for congruency, an aspect worth noting regards the materials 
used. Recall that the images presented to participants contained an exemplar of the gender 
stereotype (a man or a woman) in a naturalistic background, such as a living room or a garden. The 
changing objects, while varying in congruency with the stereotype exemplar, were carefully 
selected to maintain congruency with the backgrounds – a control measure to ensure that 
differences in RTs were due to congruency with the stereotype and not with the backgrounds. 
However, our study has no means of determining if, either during gist processing or later in the 
trial, participants were in fact attending (and creating expectations from) the stereotypes or the 
backgrounds. There is a possibility that the scenery (e.g., bathroom), and not the stereotype, took 
over the role of context – in this situation, congruency between object and stereotype would not be 
processed, as it would be overridden by congruency between object and scenery. All trials would, 
then, be congruent trials, and no congruency or incongruency effect involving object would be 
detected.  
Choice of stereotype must also be discussed. Gender is typically associated with specific 
roles (in fact, commonly known as gender roles), in which are included the different behaviors or 
characteristics expected of each gender, that are passed on from generation to generation 
(Neculăesei, 2015). As such, expectations regarding gender vary from culture to culture (e.g., man 
are leaders, women are maternal). Hofstede (2017) explores, among other characteristics, how 
different societies differ regarding how strict such gender roles are: those in which the roles are 
polarized and distinct are labeled Masculine; those in which the roles overlap are named Feminine. 
On this axis, according to the author, Portugal has a low score of 31 – a more feminine culture. 
With this in mind, a lack of a congruency effect might result from the fact that expectations 
regarding gender roles are not strong or exclusive enough to trigger a distinct response to congruent 
and incongruent trials. For example, a man next to women’s shoes might be recognized, upon 
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deliberation, as somewhat inconsistent (after all, the objects were strongly associated with one 
gender in pre-test), but still not strike the participant as something out of the ordinary, or deserving 
more attention and urgency. 
 
Object gender 
The next initial finding was an effect of object gender, in which female objects were 
detected significantly faster than male objects. A hypothesis based on familiarity was proposed: 
considering that the sample was largely female (78%), could female objects be easier to recognize 
and detect? In short, can familiarity (or, considering we used everyday objects, superfamiliarity; 
Buttle & Raymond, 2003) improve detection? This motivational hypothesis is not a novel factor, 
with other studies already suggesting that expertise (which implies familiarity) can inhibit change 
blindness under the flicker paradigm (Curran, Gibson, Horne, Young, & Bozell, 2009; Jones, Jones, 
Smith, & Copley, 2003; Werner & Thies, 2000), resulting in lower RTs for changes using familiar 
objects and scenes. To explore this possibility further, we conducted separate analyses for our 
female and male participants and observed that the benefit for female objects was found in the 
female sample, but not in the male sample. It is important to highlight, however, that our male 
sample had only 16 male participants – the results cannot be taken as conclusive. 
The object gender effect can also be linked to the materials – namely, we hypothesized that 
differences in object saliency might attract eye gaze differently (Boyer, Smith, Yu, & Bertenthal, 
2011; Underwood & Foulsham, 2006; Underwood, Foulsham, van Loon, Humphreys, & Bloyce, 
2006; Wright, 2005). To test this perceptive hypothesis, we focused on scenes that registered 
significantly different RTs for male and female objects – in all, the same benefit for female objects 
was observed. Saliency maps and scores created for these scenes provided a viable alternative 
explanation for the observed faster detection of female objects. After removal of these scenes, no 
effect of object gender was found, strengthening the perceptive hypothesis. 
Another reason why the perceptive hypothesis prevails over the familiarity hypothesis is 
that participants were instructed to merely detect, even when unable to name the change (as is 
typical of identifications tasks). Unlike a correct identification, a correct detection can occur even 
when the object is not fully registered in subjective awareness but instead only sensed (Rensink, 
2004). Because the current study provides no data regarding eye gaze, detections without directly 
looking at the changing object are a possibility that cannot be discarded. Without solid data on how 
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often participants directed their gaze at the changing objects, effectively perceiving them, a 
hypothesis based on familiarity cannot be safely advanced. Considering evidence for implicit 
memory (see Schacter, 1987), it can be argued that recognition and familiarity can occur even 
outside of conscious awareness of detailed visual perception. It can even be argued that, having 
used everyday objects, previous exposure had been established. But if the effect of object gender 
could be attributed to familiarity, we would expect it to be expressed significantly in all the scenes, 
instead of only in three (25%) that also had differing saliency configurations. 
 
Threshold 
The only effect consistently detected in every stage of the analysis was that of threshold. 
After removal of the four scenes with saliency issues, change occurring at 1200ms was detected 
significantly slower when compared to the two other conditions (400ms and 800ms). The three 
different thresholds were created to detect and eliminate participants who did not follow 
instructions, and as such was an original addition to the procedure and the flicker task. Our 
literature review found only one study with a similar manipulation of threshold, as defined by the 
time between the start of a trial, and the moment when change first occurs. Focusing on whether 
visual information is integrated along repeated exposures into a long-term memory representations, 
Vierck and Kiesel (2008) recorded RTs in a variety of configurations of original (A) and altered 
images (B). Experiment 1 compared conditions AB vs. AABB vs. AAAAABBBBB – much like 
the present study, the change happens increasingly later, with more displays of the original 
unmodified image filling in for the time until change occurs. Also similarly to the present study, 
the highest threshold (AAAAABBBBB condition) registered significantly higher RTs, with the 
two first conditions registering no significant difference between them. Note, however, that the 
alternation does not return to an ABAB format once change happens; instead, the authors purposely 
defined each cycle to contain as many repetitions of A as of B. From this method and the observed 
RTs, they conclude: “repetitions are more beneficial for change detection when they affect both 
the original and the modified versions of the stimulus material.” (Vierck & Kiesel, 2008, p. 320) 
Experiment 3 compares an AAABBB cycle with an AAAAAB cycle – this last one being similar 
to the procedure used in our study. Once more, the condition with more repetitions of the original 
image yielded higher RTs (i.e., worse performance and slower detection). The authors interpret 
these results as evidence of “the importance of presenting both picture versions for a prolonged 
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time” (p. 321) to allow for comparable representations in long-term memory, linking change 
detection performance to those representations. Our results do not contradict this interpretation – 
our 400, 800, and 1200ms conditions can be translated, respectively, to AB, AAB, and AAAB. As 
the imbalance between the two versions increased, so did RTs.  
However, there may be an alternative to the “long exposure of both images” explanation 
that accounts for both Vierck and Kiesel's (2008) and our own results. If repetition of the unchanged 
image (A) continuously adds information to memory, this progressive complexifying of our pre-
change visual representation might be more cognitively taxing, requiring more resources, which 
would be translated to longer RTs. For instance, retrieval of a specific area of an image (to compare 
pre- and post-change) might be made more difficult due to the quantitative increase of stimulus to 
be attended to and encoded during longer thresholds. It is known, in memory literature, that 
increasing a list of items in a memory set can lead to longer retrieval times (Sternberg, 1969); as 
for visual memory and change blindness, limiting the amounts of items to be retrieved for 
comparison, usually by cueing something about the upcoming change (such as its location), seems 
to improve detection performance (Hollingworth, 2003). In this case, repeating the pre-change 
version of the image might just be adding to the list of objects or features to be retrieved for 
comparison, slowing down the detection process.   
A different proposal can be advanced to account for our results regarding threshold: a 
change in strategy. We have outlined the importance of gist processing, how it is triggered early, 
occurring in the first 150ms after presentation of an image (Biederman, 1981; Sampanes, Tseng, 
& Bridgeman, 2008) and guiding our search for objects according to expectations. However, it is 
possible that failing to detect change, or to find a target object, the gist strategy is eventually 
replaced by different strategies. If the amount of time allocated to gist processing is shorter than 
that during which the unedited image is repeated (e.g. within the first 1200ms of the presentation 
of the first image), change could occur when a different strategy is already in place. Tatler, 
Gilchrist, and Rusted (2003) attempted to construct a timeline of what we attend to, and how we 
build visual representations – what happens when we are exposed to a scene, and in what order? 
Subjects in their study were shown an image for durations ranging between 1 and 10 seconds. 
Afterwards, they were asked questions about the image, covering information regarding: gist, 
presence, shape, color, position, and relative distance. By crossing information from the duration 
of the images with performance on the follow-up questions, they were able to conclude that: 
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a) Performance for gist-related questions peaks at 1s, remaining unchanged with longer 
exposure. At 1s, performance for all other questions is still at chance level; 
b) At 2s, performance in questions regarding absolute position is above chance; all other 
categories (e.g., presence) seem to require longer exposures; 
c) For presence and shape information, performance “has not reached an obvious plateau 
even after 10s” (p. 589). 
  
In short, gist processing seems to be the first strategy, triggered as soon as 150ms 
(Biederman, 1981) and keeping active up to first second; information about absolute position is 
attended to at 2s of exposure; information regarding presence of objects in the image can take as 
long as 10s to be adequately attended to, in order to translate to above-chance performance in 
follow-up questions. Note that Tatler et al. (2003) is probing explicit memory. As we have reviewed 
here (see Appendix A), detection is not necessarily explicit or able to be reported on explicitly. In 
fact, we have reviewed evidence of the impact of expectations, and congruency effects with neutral 
stimuli, many being registered at times much shorter than 2s or 10s. It is hard to determine if the 
times reported by Tatler et al. (2003) put the theory of a timeline of different strategies into 
question, or if they reflect limitations in recalling information instead. 
Nevertheless, the debate over global vs. local processing is not new. Seminal work by 
Navon (1977, p. 354) argues that global processing takes temporal precedence, “in a process of 
being zoomed in on, where at first it is relatively indistinct and then it gets clearer and sharper.” In 
review, Kimchi (1992) noted that many factors can influence how perception occurs, but concludes 
that, all things being equal, global processing usually precedes local processing, with evidence that 
it occurs early in the moment of perception. In short, research on responses to visual stimuli seem 
to converge on a two-phase model (Gale, 1997, p. 131): a first and early stage, characterized by 
“preattentive or distributed” visual processing; and a subsequent stage, “focal attention”, 
processing details from a specific area, and display scanning with eye movement. 
From this, we propose that a change of strategy, from global (gist) to local, can account for 
the slower detection in our 1200ms condition. Gist processing, at work during the 400ms and 
800ms marks, attends to the globality of the image, dispersing attention in a way that increases the 
probability of detecting a changing object. Local processing, however, focuses attention on specific 
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details or regions of the image; for the changing object to be detected, change would have to occur 
in the area being observed, effectively lowering the probability of detecting change early in the 
process. This proposal can be tested by replicating the study and adding eye-tracking measures, 
making it possible to identify the dispersion of attention typical of gist-processing, as well as the 
focalized attention that would follow it.   
Finally, a change of strategy might combine with how we encode and compare information 
across scenes to explain our threshold effect. Hollingworth and Henderson (2002) report that 
changes to objects that were previously fixated were detected at a higher rate, (vs. changes to non-
fixated objects). Regarding how this may impact a flicker task, Hollingworth (2006, p. 794) 
suggests that several seconds may be needed before each potential changing object is fixated on, 
“explaining delays in detection of repeating changes, such as those in the flicker paradigm”.  
But why would this affect longer thresholds (1200ms) and not shorter ones (400ms and 
800ms)? One possibility is that the switch from gist processing to a localized, focalized search also 
lowers the likelihood of change occurring in a previously fixated area (hence improving detection) 
– after all, in local search, attention moves from object to object, or region to region, and only by 
chance would a relevant region (i.e., where change occurs) be fixated before all others in the image.  
 
Limitations and further research 
Our findings contribute to filling a gap in knowledge regarding how stereotypes-as-context 
impact congruent and incongruent changes in a change blindness task. Congruency effects 
previously demonstrated in flicker tasks using neutral stimuli were not observed with our 
stereotyped backgrounds. This opens the possibility that, while being schemas, stereotypes act 
differently on congruency according to the type of task. While shoot/don’t shoot tasks seem to 
register a clear impact of stereotype-object congruency (Correll et al., 2002), our task did not – in 
fact, stereotype alone did not register a significant effect either. As that studies in change detection 
using stereotypes and congruency are either scarce or nonexistent, our results alone cannot be read 
as robust evidence that stereotype-object congruency has no impact. However, three possibilities 
can be raised from our study: stereotype-object matching does not interfere with the specific 
phenomenon of change blindness; the flicker paradigm is inadequate to detect it; the choice of 
gender stereotype is inadequate, either for activating other interfering processes or by excessive 
overlap in gender roles. 
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Further research should tackle the open question regarding a possible effect if we had used 
an identification version of this task (since the studies we reviewed that used stereotypes asked 
participants to identify critical stimuli). This could be settled by changing the instructions shown 
to participants and by adding a selection screen between each trial to collect responses regarding 
the identity of the changing objects. 
The possibility that congruency between object and setting may override congruency (or 
incongruency) with the stereotype should also be addressed in future research. Using naturalistic 
stimuli required depicting familiar locations, such as a bathroom or a garden. These, consequently, 
activate a series of representations of objects that we usually expect to see in such settings. 
Clarification is needed in terms of what is more dominant when we observe images such as the 
ones used here: processing of congruency with the setting, or processing of congruency with an 
exemplar of a stereotype? The literature here reviewed tells us that a photograph of a bedroom can 
activate the representation of clothing, and even influence the speed at which it is detected. But 
adding an exemplar of a stereotype complicates matters: if a man is seen in the bedroom, men’s 
shoes would be congruent with both setting and stereotype – but women’s shoes would be 
congruent with the setting, while incongruent with the stereotype. Which one is primarily 
processed? The effect of stereotype-object congruency becomes harder to isolate. As such, further 
explorations of this topic should take this issue into account and include conditions of incongruency 
with the background. Ideally, a task could be setup to establish which of the congruencies is 
dominant – if any – but it would require backgrounds from which expectations are impossible, or 
at least unlikely. In other words, a step away from naturalistic stimuli. 
 Limitations regarding method can also be addressed. Saliency, for instance, was considered 
only after data collection. Analyzing saliency maps beforehand would allow for more precise control 
over that confounding factor. The same control could be considered for objects’ shapes and colors. 
Some questions raised by our results could also be answered by adding an eye-tracking 
component to the experiment. Gaze information would allow for precise information regarding 
where participants attended (e.g., did they attend to stereotypes or random objects in the setting?); 
more importantly, it would yield information regarding the question of gist vs. local visual search, 
possibly providing explanatory evidence of the significant differences in RT observed between 
threshold conditions. Naturally, these limitations can also be read as details to consider (and 
valuable additions) to future research.  
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Appendix A – Literature Review 
 
Change blindness - what it is 
There is little variance in how change blindness is defined in scientific literature – in short, 
it is the “the inability to detect changes to an object or scene” (Simons & Levin, 1997, p. 261). 
While many variations of the phenomenon have been explored in laboratory settings (for a review, 
see Simons & Ambinder, 2005; Simons & Rensink, 2005), it also happens frequently in our 
everyday life. One relatable example is known in the movie industry as a continuity error: a lack 
of consistency in a scene’s objects, characters, or details, usually occurring between cuts, and very 
infrequently noticed (as illustrated in Figure A1).  
 
The example of continuity errors in movies reflects how pervasive and unnoticed change 
blindness is. After all, every movie has multiple of such errors, and yet most of the audience barely 
ever notices one. Even those involved in moviemaking fail to notice such visual inconsistencies, 
despite being repeatedly exposed to the material. We may think we are good at detecting changes, 
but instead we appear to be blind to our own change blindness – change blindness blindness (Levin, 
Drivdahl, Momen, & Beck, 2002; Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, & Simons, 2000). 
Defining change blindness implies defining the concept of change to an operable level. 
Moreover, change can, indeed, be distinguished from other types of visual phenomena that can also 
be missed or detected by an observer. Rensink (2002) underlines the importance of this distinction 
by noting how separate visual phenomena are often based on different perceptual processes, 
sometimes correlated, but also able to be detected independently by adequate methods.  
Figure A1. Continuity error in the popular film Star Wars. Episode I, The Phantom Menace. Anakin reaches for the android with 
his left arm in the first shot, but is seen using his right arm immediately after the camera cuts  (McCallum & Lucas, 1999). 
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When the author uses the word change, it is in reference to a “transformation or 
modification of something over time” (p. 248) and, as such, distinct from motion – an also 
detectable phenomenon, but consisting of a modification of position, or location, by a determined 
and measurable quantity. With motion, there is no direct modification of an entity or structure itself 
– a central requirement in the definition of change within the context of change blindness.  
Change can also be contrasted with difference in the sense that the former is relative to one 
single entity, while the latter refers to dissimilarity between more than one entity. Consequently, 
difference can be determined by atemporal comparison of the two separate entities, while change 
implies transformation and, therefore, different moments in time (a before and an after). This 
temporal requirement allows us to also distinguish between two types of changes that can be 
observed: one that is in progress, perceived as ongoing, in the present – in short, a dynamic change 
(imagine an object that slowly fades in or out of a picture; e.g. Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 
2000); and one that has already occurred in the past, unwitnessed in its progress between a previous 
and a present state, and perceived as a completed change.  
  
What exactly happens? 
Why is it apparently hard to notice something changing from one visual scene to the next? 
If we perceive and process both scenes, why are we not always alerted to a difference between the 
two? Or do we even process both scenes? 
In a review of the research surrounding change blindness, Simons (2000) describes standing 
explanations to the phenomenon – each suggesting different ways in which information from visual 
scenes is processed. While the author attempts to list “all of the plausible models that have been 
considered” (p. 8), it is important to underline that no single theory can account for all findings in 
the field, and whatever mechanism is in action may also depend on a study’s method, stimuli, and 
context (e.g., is change detection the primary or secondary task? Are the stimuli simple or 
naturalistic and complex? Does the experiment happen in the laboratory or in real-life situations?).  
The first proposal, overwriting, states that information from the first image is indeed 
encoded (i.e., a representation of the scene is abstracted), but will afterwards be either replaced or 
overwritten by information from the second scene. When presented with complex scenes (e.g., 
naturalistic stimuli, such as photographs or video), some visual information is encoded into a 
representation of the scene; however, details of the scene that were not attended to are replaced by 
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information from the subsequent scene (after change is introduced). This model predicts, therefore, 
that change blindness would happen exclusively for unattended details of the visual scene. 
The first impressions model claims that the main purpose of perception is to extract 
meaning from our environment (and, consequently, visual scenes). As such, features of a scene that 
more adequately inform us of its meaning are encoded; everything else, being peripheral to this 
goal, goes unchecked and remains absent from our representation of the scene. Contrary to the 
overwriting model, details of the first scene are in fact encoded – but only those that communicate 
meaning. It is the details of the subsequent scene, including the change, that are not processed. 
Note that this model, to work as stated, requires that the meaning of the scene is not changed by 
the introduction of a change. 
A third model proposes that everything is stored, though not always compared: central to 
this model is the assumption that we are able to simultaneously hold two representations of a visual 
scene that contain differences (changes) between them. Change blindness occurs as these 
differences, until pointed out, remain undetected. This “pointing out” can be, for instance, a change 
that either draws attention due to its perceptive properties, or that alters the meaning of the scene 
significantly. If such highlighting of the change does not happen, “participants may form 
representations of the details both before and after the change, but never bother to compare the 
two” (Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002, p. 300). Studies aiming to provide evidence of 
the existence of both pre- and post-change representations of visual scenes have simultaneously 
provided evidence against an interpretation of change blindness as occurring due to nothing being 
stored – in short, the world itself, being ever-present, is our storage of scenes we witness. Such 
studies adopt the incidental change task; when participants fail to detect a changing object (e.g., 
disappearing), they are asked if they remember that object. This was the method used by Simons, 
Chabris, Schnur, and Levin (2002): in a real-life interaction, participants failed to notice when a 
basketball would disappear from the interlocutor’s hands, during a disruption by a passing group 
of pedestrians. However, they would later recall the basketball, even describing it correctly. In a 
laboratory setting Mitroff, Simons, and Levin (2004) demonstrated that participants could 
recognize an object present in a prechange conditions (i.e., replaced by a different object during 
the change), even when they had no conscious of that change.  
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Experimental paradigms 
Learning about the circumstances in which we fail to detect changes also informs us as to 
how and when we do detect them; as such, part of the literature uses the term change detection, 
referring to “the visual processes involved in first noticing a change” (Rensink, 2002, p. 246). 
Whether under the name change blindness or change detection, many paradigms have been 
proposed to shed light on the phenomenon. The earlier studies on change detection were not yet 
using the naturalistic stimuli (photography or video) that are commonplace today: French (1953), 
for instance, used patterns of dots presented to participants with a 6-second interval. Participants 
were asked to determine if the two patterns were the same (or if something had changed). This 
method falls under the category of gap-contingent methods: change happens during a period 
between two stimuli, in which nothing is shown (in French’s case, the 6 seconds between patterns). 
The time between stimuli is today referred to as an interstimulus interval (hereinafter referred to 
as ISI). Other studies picked up on this method (e.g. Pashler, 1988); a particular variation went 
beyond showing the two stimuli once and asking for a response (a method known as “forced 
response”), and instead it would rapidly cycle the two stimuli and a blank screen (ISI) in alternation 
until observers detected a change – the flicker paradigm (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; 
Simons, 2000). In this paradigm, the change happens repeatedly until either the observer detects it, 
or a set number of cycles is reached and the trial ends (see Figure A2). Unlike forced response 
paradigms, the measured variable is not the number of correct or incorrect responses, but reaction 
times – or how long before the participants noticed the change.   
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A blank screen is not the only way to disrupt the viewing of a scene and introduce a change. 
Other noteworthy methods include using “mudsplashes” – instead of replacing the entire image, 
shapes are momentarily superimposed while changes are introduced (O’Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 
1999) – or using our eye’s natural movements, whether introducing changes during a saccade (e.g., 
Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999), or during natural and induced blinking (e.g., O’Regan, Deubel, 
Clark, & Rensink, 2000). In all these methods, severe impairment in change detection is observed. 
The increase in usage of more realistic materials continued until the experiment was taken 
out of the lab, with designs that simulate real life scenarios. Levin and Simons (1997) composed 
short videos in which changes were introduced during cuts (a jump to a different camera angle). 
Changes were not all minimal (e.g. a random object in the background), sometimes changing the 
actors themselves (the attended object); nevertheless, they went largely unnoticed by participants. 
The same authors (Simons & Levin, 1998) finally took to the streets, replacing an actor during two 
real-life interactions: pedestrians were asked for directions by one of the experimenters, but were 
interrupted by two men carrying a door between them. While behind the door, the experimenter is 
replaced by a second actor. In two studies, the change was noticed by seven out of 15 participants, 
and four out of 12 participants. 
Conclusions from these studies seem to converge in two ways:  
 
Figure A2. The flicker paradigm (Rensink et al, 1997). Original image (A) and modified (A´, 
with lowered wall) are alternated with a blank screen. Cycle repeats a fixed number of times, 
or until participants stops it. 
Note. Reprinted from “Changes”, by Rensink. R., 2002, Progress in brain research, 140, p. 
199. Copyright 2002 by Elsevier Ltd. 
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a) our capacity to retain detailed information regarding a visual scene is, at most, limited  
– a disruption in a visual field (such as eye movements, blinks, or blank screens) seems 
to impair our ability to retain information from one moment to the next (Simons, 2000); 
b) the role of one key factor in change blindness performance – attention. When Rensink 
and collaborators (1997, p. 372) established the flicker paradigm, they also concluded 
that detection of change “occurs only when that object is given focused attention”, 
supporting it with results showing that change detection was better in areas of “central 
interest” (defined by the authors as those objects or regions most frequently named in 
descriptions of the observed scene). 
 
On attention 
Attention, in its everyday meaning, is a concept familiar to everyone. William James (1890, 
p. 403) had no issue in stating it directly – “Every one knows what attention is” – but then proceeds 
to define it as “the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem 
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.” A full exploration of attention and its 
impact in cognition is beyond the scope of this literature review, but one particular aspect is relevant 
to change blindness/change detection: its limits, and how they are efficiently managed to respond 
to the situation at hand. Harris and Jenkin (2001), in their thorough definition of attention and its 
different types, begin by highlighting how it is a compromise: it is a finite resource to be allocated 
to some stimuli, in detriment of others. It is a second filter after what the senses already impose 
(e.g., the limits of our field of vision). In short, no individual can attend to everything.  
 
The role of attention on change detection was expanded on by other studies. The already 
mentioned studies of change blindness using film (Levin & Simons, 1997, p. 505) showed that 
“even dramatic changes to the very object that is the center of attention often go unnoticed” – 
attention might be undeniably important, but it is not sufficient to detect changes. Simons and 
Chabris (1999) focused on this “inattentional blindness” (see Mack & Rock, 1998, for more on this 
concept) – in their method, a video task in which two teams (dressed either in black or white shirts) 
passed a basketball between them. Participants were instructed to count how many passes were 
done by one team. During the video, a man dressed as a gorilla would walk across the image – in 
one condition, the gorilla was highly salient (even facing the camera and thumping its chest) and 
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remained in sight for nine full seconds. Even in such conditions, approximately half of the sample 
failed to detect the change. Note that the object (the man dressed as a gorilla) would often cross the 
region that was being attended, and still go unnoticed. It is important to highlight that Simons and 
Chabris' (1999) task did not instruct participants to detect change at the start of the experiment, 
instead giving them a different task to perform: counting the passes of a specific team. In other 
words, diverting attention to a task (and away from the introduced change) impaired change 
detection despite it happening in the attended region of the scene. This is in accordance with 
Rensink's (2002) suggestion that instead of creating a detailed representation of visual scenes, we 
rely on a more adapted representation, adequate to the specific demands of each task, and the 
participant’s expectations – a dynamic representation.  
In short, when we are involved and focused on a demanding task, an object change “does 
not automatically capture attention when it is incidental to the primary focus of attention” (Simons 
& Mitroff, 2001, p. 189). This proposal is also compatible with something Simons and Chabris 
(1999) noted from their experiment: that the change was unexpected.  
 
On expectations 
Change detection of an unexpected object is the core feature of the “incidental approach” 
to the topic in research – as opposed to an “intentional approach” (Simons & Mitroff, 2001). Studies 
such as French (1953), and Rensink and colleagues (1997), instruct participants to try and detect a 
change in a visual scene – that is their main task – and as such are examples of the intentional 
approach to change detection. Stimuli are not always naturalistic, and the experiments are usually 
conducted in a laboratory setting. Moreover, while intentional visual search tasks are also present 
in our day-to-day life (e.g., trying to locate an empty spot in a car park, or a coin that has been 
dropped on the sidewalk), they do not represent every mode or method of visual processing while 
we navigate rich visual environments. 
The incidental approach assumes change detection as secondary, instructing observers to 
perform a different task while the change is implemented in the scene. This is the category in which 
studies such as Levin and Simons (changes between cuts in motion pictures; 1997), and Simons 
and Chabris (gorilla in the background; 1999) would fall under: what is measured is our 
performance in detecting changes that are secondary to the task at hand. Using naturalistic stimuli 
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and environments, the incidental approach aims to generalize findings to real-life situations in 
which we are not intentionally looking for a change.  
Expectations, however, go beyond whether we expect a change to happen. It is hard to even 
define if we expect changes when we go about our days: we certainly don’t think that everything 
in our visual field is immutable, and we expect such mutability (e.g., we know outdoor ads can 
flash different colors, even if we cannot always predict them), but we have also learned not to 
expect every change (e.g., an outdoor ad becoming sentient and walking away). Our surrounding, 
itself, is rich in cues regarding what we can expect. For instance, someone yelling out the lyrics to 
a song might be expected in a rock concert but would certainly hold our attention at the opera; a 
pedestrian might attract little attention if she is simply crossing the road but might be more 
noticeable if doing it while floating six meters above the ground. 
How does this translate to research? What are, then, the types of expectations that we 
abstract from context?1 To be able to answer these questions it is important to establish that we do 
abstract something from context – and change blindness tasks have also proven helpful here. Recall 
Rensink and colleagues (1997, p. 368), and their study in which the flicker paradigm was 
introduced; one of the conclusions was that object identification was faster when objects were 
deemed by participants as “important to the scene”. It is not surprising that subjects can determine 
what is of central or marginal interest in a scene: a meaningful representation of a visual scene can 
be obtained in a glance as short as 150 milliseconds (Biederman, 1981). This proposition that we 
can quickly obtain a gist of a visual scene found support from different studies: for instance, 
changes that alter the gist of a scene are more rapidly detected (Sampanes, Tseng, & Bridgeman, 
2008); scene inversion (i.e., showing pictures upside down) eliminates the effect of object interest, 
and no benefit for object of central interest is registered in the form of significantly lower reaction 
times (Kelley, Chun, & Chua, 2003; Shore & Klein, 2000); scene jumbling (method by which an 
image is cut into various pieces that are randomly recombined) and randomly rearranging objects 
also translates to impairments in change blindness performance, suggesting that an understandable 
                                                 
 
 
1 Context informs many other cognitive processes that fall outside the scope of this literature review and 
project (for a more broad review, see Chun, 2000). As such, this section focuses on contextual influences that relate 
directly to change blindness. 
47 
 
scene context can help in change detection (Biederman, Glass, & Stacy, 1973; Zimmermann, 
Schnier, & Lappe, 2010). 
If we perceive the gist (i.e., general meaning, or the essence) of a visual scene, we may also 
be able to draw helpful expectations regarding, for instance, what objects might be present in the 
image, what absolute positions they may occupy (e.g., top or bottom), or even their spatial 
relationship to other objects in the scene. When observing a scene, we define, then, “useful 
constraints on the range of possible objects that can be expected to occur within that context” – the 
act of abstracting such constraints from context defined the contextual cueing paradigm (Chun, 
2000, p. 171). The helpfulness of the information we draw from context derives from the fact that 
certain types of object usually appear together in our visual field – the correlations, or how objects 
cluster, are not random, instead co-varying according to specific environments and generating 
predictability (and we seem to learn these co-variations both fast and automatically; Fiser & Aslin, 
2001, 2005). For instance, in most situations, a desk is usually accompanied by a chair; Oliva and 
Torralba (2007, p. 521) illustrate the consistency of these spatial relationships and configurations 
by overlapping hundreds of images that represent, in its natural context, a specific object (edited to 
have the same scale and pose in each picture). The result shows patterns that indicate how objects 
are usually organized around the object, revealing its “influence beyond its own boundaries” (see 
Figure A3). The same can be said for an object’s position: in a photograph of a landscape, we 
expect a house to be on the bottom half. 
 
Figure A3. Average of hundreds of pictures containing the same object, centered and scaled to match. 
The most common features of the object's surrounding space are represented with higher intensity, 
showing how objects establish frequent spatial relations. 
Note. Reprinted from “The role of context in object recognition”, by Oliva, A. and Torralva, A., 2007, 
Trends in cognitive science, 11(12), p. 521. Copyright 2002 by Elsevier Ltd. 
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Research has backed up the assumptions of the contextual cueing paradigm. For example, 
Biederman, Mezzanotte, and Rabinowitz (1982) show that when objects in a scene violate the 
typical spatial relationships (e.g., a floating sofa, a fire hydrant that appears on top of a mailbox), 
its detectability is reduced – in other words, higher reaction times are registered for when the object 
is correctly detected. One particularly interesting violation was named Probability by the authors 
and defined as “the likelihood of a given object being in a given scene”; they add that being from 
a semantic nature, it would require “access to the referential meaning of the object” (p. 146). 
Semantic processing of cues from context was also explored by Palmer (1975), in an experiment 
in which specific contexts were initially shown to participants (e.g., depictions of a kitchen or a 
living room), followed by illustrations of object that were presented between 20 and 120 
milliseconds. Results show that independently of exposure time, “the probability of correctly 
identifying an object is highest following an appropriate context” (p. 521). More recent research 
efforts, while resorting to different methods, report similar conclusions: objects are correctly 
identified more frequently if placed in a consistent background (i.e., one that depicts where they 
naturally occur in the real-world), and a short glimpse at the visual scene (80 milliseconds) is 
enough for the effect to be observed (Davenport & Potter, 2004; Munneke, Brentari, & Peelen, 
2013)2. 
The research reviewed above offers empirical support for the key role of context in 
perception, focusing mainly on identification and using a variety of methods. Change blindness 
and change detection can, however, happen without our being able to identify the change or 
changing object (Sagi & Julesz, 1984; Straube & Fahle, 2011; Xu, 2008). We can perceive changes 
to a visual scene despite not being able to pinpoint exactly what changed – detection tasks instruct 
the participants to do just that. At this stage, the question to answer is: does consistency (or 
congruency) between changed object and scene context, in change blindness tasks, benefit 
detection? Hollingworth and Henderson (2000), for instance, note the opposite: a main effect of 
semantic consistency in which responses to inconsistent targets register significantly faster reaction 
                                                 
 
 
2 Note: these studies were referenced to illustrate contextual cueing – due to differences in method, these 
studies cannot be classified as change blindness studies, or in the line of the flicker paradigm. 
49 
 
times, when compared to consistent targets. In short, “a change to an object is more easily detected 
when that object is semantically inconsistent with its scene” (p. 234). 
Hollingworth and Henderson (2000) used the flicker paradigm proposed by Rensink et al 
(1997), which is named by LaPointe and Milliken (2016, p. 8) as the “one task that has produced 
performance benefit for semantically incongruent object reliably and robustly”. Not surprisingly, 
they used the same task to show that eye-movement is drawn to such objects. 
LaPointe, Lupianez, and Milliken (2013) attempted to clarify the impact of task type: 
detection vs. identification. To do so, the authors used a close variation of the flicker task (in fact, 
a revision of the authors’ version was used in this dissertation) with original stimuli. In the first 
experiment, the same benefit for incongruent trials was observed (in the form of lower reaction 
times), but it is debatable if the task can be categorized as a detection task when after each trial 
participants were “prompted to make a one-word response to identify the changing object” (p. 105). 
There is no doubt that, if participants were unaware of this specific part of the task at the start, the 
first trial might be a true detection task. But participants might also assume, after the first trial, that 
they would have to identify objects from then onwards, triggering processes typical of identification 
tasks. 
Experiments 2 and 3 yield results that might be more helpful in highlighting a possible 
difference between task type, as both studies include a condition in which the ISI (interstimulus 
interval) is eliminated (i.e., 0ms, meaning that the original and edited image would cycle between 
them with no blank screen in between). Experiment 2 maintained the requirement of identifying 
the changing object, and faster reaction times were registered for congruent trials. However, 
experiment 3 asked participants not to identify the object, but to indicate the location of the change 
(which does not imply identification) – for both the 250 milliseconds and 0 milliseconds ISI 
conditions, a benefit to incongruent trials was observed. In short, an identification requirement 
seems to benefit congruency, while a detection requirement prioritizes incongruency. This 
conclusion, consistent with the literature reviewed so far, is also supported in three experiments by 
Ortiz-Tudela et al (2016), in which both detection and identification are analyzed: detection favors 
the incongruent, while identification benefits the congruent. 
Why does it happen? LaPointe and Milliken (2016, 2017) suggest an explanation based on 
a dual-process model. On one side, and following the suggestions of contextual cueing, they 
emphasize the role of factors such as prior knowledge or expertise in identification tasks (by means 
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of abstracting expectations regarding objects from context information). As for detection, it 
benefits incongruency due to “attention capture processes”, fine-tuned to details considered 
informative, conflicting, and therefore incongruent in their contexts. 
 
On stereotypes 
The leading question of this project picks up on the idea that context in a visual scene (i.e., 
a stimulus background in a flicker task) can trigger expectations regarding what objects are 
probably present or absent. We ask if stereotypes can be seen as context, and if so, what effect 
would be observed if they were included in a change detection task? The question is based on the 
idea that, much like the context mentioned in the reviewed literature, stereotypes are known to 
activate other concepts.  
Asserting a definition of stereotype is useful. Although the term tends to assume a negative 
connotation in everyday language (as they are equated with their most negative and visible 
consequences), studies in social cognition opt to underline that they are in fact a product of human 
nature – as a phenomenon, it is heuristic and efficient. Greenwald and Banaji (1995), for instance, 
define it as a group of socially shared beliefs, regarding traits that are characteristic of members of 
a particular social category. In the same review, they quote Allport (1954, p.191): “A stereotype is 
an exaggerated belief associated with a category”.  
The difference between common use of the term stereotype and its academic definition 
corresponds, then, to the difference between an inadequate tool, and the unfortunate use of a 
valuable tool (for a historical review of stereotypes under the lens of social cognition, see Garcia-
Marques & Garcia-Marques, 2003, and Monteith, Woodcock, & Gulker, 2013). Note that tools, 
throughout humankind’s history, have been invented in the interaction with our environments, so 
that we could more easily navigate it, manipulate it, ever more efficiently. Macrae and colaborators 
(1994) underline this parallel between physical tools and our cognitive toolbox: a collection of 
various mechanisms that allow for an efficient processing of the worlds excess of stimuli. In their 
words, “individuation, in its many guises, is a rather time consuming and effortful affair” (p. 37). 
In seminal work on stereotypes, the authors underlined their energy-saving potential. Participants 
were asked to perform two simultaneous tasks: forming impressions from a list of trait descriptors 
while attending to information in audio form. Trait lists included either a name (e.g., John), or a 
name accompanied by a stereotypical label (e.g., John – skinhead). As hypothesized, the presence 
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of stereotypical information simplified the impression forming process, consequently freeing 
resources to the second task, and improving performance. This demonstrates that the effects of 
stereotypes go beyond the usually negative outcomes, such as discrimination. 
In the popular definition, stereotypes have a negative connotation partly (if not entirely) 
due to the visibility of some behaviors that stem from them, and the negative consequences of such 
behaviors. As a result, stereotypes are often equated with concepts such as prejudice or 
discrimination, although they are, by definition, different. Prejudice refers to an attitude towards a 
member of a group by the mere fact that he or she belongs to that group; it is generally a negative 
attitude – in other words, a negative evaluation of a person based on perceived belonging to a social 
category or group. Discrimination, on the other hand, refers to behavior, or taking (again, generally 
negative) action towards someone based only on perceived belonging to a group. 
Other misconceptions regarding stereotypes can be named. For instance, while the most 
visible and talked about stereotypic beliefs are false (e.g., Latinos are lazy), that is not necessarily 
true in every situation. The stereotype that men are more aggressive than women can be 
demonstrated as truthful by crime rates and records of domestic violence, in which the perpetrators 
are mostly male (Portugal included, PORDATA, 2018).  
It is also a misconception that stereotypes always translate into behaviors. For instance, 
Devine's (1989) dualist model predicts that while stereotype activation is indeed automatic, it is 
possible to override its influence. Given enough time, controlled processes can allow for non-
stereotypical personal beliefs to inhibit the effect of stereotypes. In the author’s results, this was 
true for participants who scored low on the modern racism scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 
1981). In short, even when we are aware of the contents of a stereotype, and even when that 
stereotype is automatically activated, its impact can be overridden by personal beliefs that 
contradict it.  
Further research has shown that even this automaticity of stereotype activation cannot be 
taken for granted (see Devine & Sharp, 2009; Monteith, Woodcock, & Gulker, 2013), instead being 
dependent on a series of conditions. For instance, “individuals who are preoccupied with other 
matters tend to not experience automatic stereotypes” with unattended social cues failing to activate 
social categories (Devine & Sharp, 2009, p. 65). Gilbert and Hixon's (1991) influential study 
suggested that, when participants were kept cognitively busy by a task (e.g., memorizing a 
number), stereotype activation failed. In a different experiment, activation was permitted: subjects 
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who were afterward kept busy with a visual search task were more likely to use those stereotypes 
while forming impressions. Cognitive busyness, then, might disable the automatic activation of 
stereotypes, but when activation occurs, busyness amplifies their usage (see also Collier & Shaffer, 
1999). 
But even when undistracted, group membership and stereotypes are only conditionally 
activated. For example, it is necessary that the perceived person is encoded in a socially meaningful 
way – using the words of Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, and Castelli (1997), it depends on 
processing goals. Summarizing their work: participants saw faces of women with the instruction 
to either detect the presence of a white dot (feature-detection), or to determine if an animate or 
inanimate object was shown (semantic-judgement). In a subsequent lexical decision task 
containing both female-stereotypic and counterstereotypic words, participants in the semantic-
judgement condition were faster at classifying stereotypic terms. This effect of semantic processing 
(perceiving people as socially relevant stimuli) is even sensitive to eye gaze (Macrae, Hood, Milne, 
Rowe, & Mason, 2002). 
The same stimulus, such as the same photo of a person, might not even activate stereotypes 
consistently, depending on the context within which it is presented. As shown by Wittenbrink, 
Judd, and Park (2001), different background pictures (e.g., stereotypically positive: church interior 
vs. stereotypically negative: street corner) interfered with participants’ “automatic responses to 
social category cues” (p. 823). 
While a full account of all factors interfering with stereotype activation would fall outside 
the relevant range of this review, an example of a situational influence can be useful in 
demonstrating the variety of ways in which stereotype activation is, indeed, conditional. In a study 
by Sinclair and Kunda (1999, p. 855), inhibition of “applicable stereotypes” is shown to be 
motivated by self-protection: participants are more likely to inhibit stereotypes associated with 
black individuals when praised by one (when compared to those criticized by a black judge). This 
study, along with the effects of context (Wittenbrink et al., 2001), demonstrate that the variability 
in which conditions might determine the activation or inhibition of stereotypes permeate our 
everyday lives and the complex social world.  
 
There is reason to expect a stereotypical stimulus (e.g., a person, member of a group) to 
activate several other concepts. Theory on implicit attitudes and their manifestations (see 
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Greenwald, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002) tells us that social knowledge is structured 
in an associative network of concepts that associate between themselves with different strength. 
Some definitions are relevant: 
 
• Concept: representations of people, groups, attributes – these being particularly relevant 
as they can assume positive or negative valence; 
• Associations: relationships between concepts; 
• Strength of association: can be understood as the potential of a concept to active other 
concepts that it is associated with or connected to; associations are bilateral. 
 
Figure A4 exemplifies this by depicting concepts that surround the self, but are also more 
or less associated with gender, as they are placed to the right (male), or the left (female). The height 
of each concept indicates valence. From the same example, we can say that by activating the 
concept of weak, the concept of old person might also be activated (e.g., more accessible in our 
memory) – this is, in fact, one of the most frequent paradigms in studies of implicit social cognition: 
priming, listed as one of the “major routes to stereotype maintenance” by Hilton and Hippel (1996, 
p. 248) on their text on stereotypes. In that text, the authors review the multiple ways in which 
Figure A4. Social knowledge structured as an associative network, in which each concept 
(elipses), once activated, can activate neighboring concepts. Line thickness represents strength. 
Note. Reprinted from “A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept”, by 
Greenwald et al, 2002, Psychological Review, 109(1), p. 5. Copyright 2002 by American Psychological 
Association, Inc. 
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priming has been a staple of research in social cognition and stereotypes, asserting that “priming 
plays a dramatic role in the perception of out-group members” (p. 248). 
We know, then, that our implicit definitions of social categories and their members create 
expectations – usually in what qualities or behaviors we expect from those individuals. In the realm 
of change blindness, this would translate to activating and expecting certain objects in a context 
that contains a stereotype. For instance, if we perceive a man in a bedroom, might we not expect 
to see a pair of men’s shoes? If we see a woman in that bedroom, would a dress not be a more 
congruent object?   
 
Other factors that influence change blindness 
While it would be outside the scope of this literature review to identify all the factors known 
to impact change blindness in some way, naming some of the most relevant will contribute to a 
better overall understanding of the phenomenon.  
Age, for example, is one such factor. For instance, Rizzo et al. (2009, p. 252) note how 
change blindness increases with both age and the onset of Alzheimer’s disease – an increase that 
correlates negatively with “performance on cognitive tests that depend on attention, memory, and 
executive functions”. Caird, Edwards, Creaser, and Horrey's (2005) study also stresses the effects 
of aging by using a modified flicker task in which the correct decision implies the detection of an 
appearing-disappearing object. The stimuli simulate real-life scenarios encountered while driving 
– namely, intersections. Younger participants performed better than older participants, with 
significantly more correct decisions.  
With driving, it is common knowledge that experience is required to develop the necessary 
skills. In research, this translates into the influence of expertise and familiarity. Werner and Thies 
(2000), for example, show the benefit of domain-specific expertise by comparing the performance 
of football players and non-players in a change detection task involving football-related and 
unrelated stimuli. Results clearly show a performance benefit for experts, when compared to 
novices. 
While expertise in football playing might come from conscious effort, training, and 
dedication, not all expertise comes about so declaratively. As Jones et al. (2003) show, heavy social 
users of cannabis and alcohol are faster at detecting substance-related changes (in a flicker task) 
when compared to substance-neutral changes. In a different example, Buttle and Raymond (2003) 
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report significantly improved performance in detecting changing faces when faces are famous and 
previously known (they call this the superfamiliarity effect). 
The example of faces has also been used to demonstrate a cultural influence in change 
blindness. In Humphreys, Hodsoll, and Campbell's (2005) adaptation of the flicker task, White 
Caucasian and Indian Asian participants detected changes faster when they occurred in the faces 
of people of the same ethnicity as theirs. The authors discuss their results as a possible outcome of 
other known processes; for example, differential encoding of faces due to different amounts of 
exposure, or a tendency to see the outgroup as more homogenous than the ingroup. 
These studies often rely on the flicker task, or an adaptation of it. But we have also reviewed 
studies that used video stimuli, as well as real-life scenarios. Gibbs, Davies, and Chou (2016, p. 
17), in a systematic review of studies with such methods, found three familiar factors affecting 
change blindness performance: “increasing attention, the saliency of the changed object and spatial 
violations significantly reduce CB”. 
Saliency, being ubiquitous in every task involving visual stimuli, should be addressed more 
thoroughly. It refers to the prominence of any stimulus, or a particular feature of a stimulus, that 
stands out from the rest (Gibbs et al., 2016). In practical terms, it means it captures human attention 
– in visual search tasks, this equates to a higher probability of holding our gaze, or fixation. This 
is not to say that saliency is dependent on the stimulus alone, capturing our attention passively 
without the observing subject’s intervention. Instead, it works similarly to how we perceive color: 
it is not a quality of the object itself, depending also on the qualities of incident light, and the 
peripheral sensory equipment of the observer. As such, an object is salient when it has certain 
properties (e.g., color, size, contrast), but also when it is relevant to the observer, and in accordance 
with situational characteristics. A bright red smartphone ad might go completely unnoticed by a 
human observer, but it might also mobilize our attention due to color and size. The same ad might 
be more salient to an observer looking to acquire a new smartphone. However, even that interested 
observer might miss the ad if it blends with an equally bright, equally colorful casino wall. In short, 
a certain “biological relevance” is needed (Jenkin & Harris, 2001). Salience happens when both 
observer, stimulus features, and situational demands meet halfway and interact. 
In research, those stimulus properties are referred to as bottom-up, or low-level saliency, 
interacting with early-stage visual processing. On the other hand, high-level saliency (top-down) 
includes semantic or motivational processing of objects and scenes (e.g., contextual cueing, 
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congruency effects). The coexistence of these processes makes it so that the impact of saliency in 
change blindness performance is not easy to predict – and the literature on the subjects reflects just 
that. For instance, Boyer et al. (2011) used the flicker paradigm to implement changes either in 
high-saliency or low-saliency objects (as determined by an algorithm, Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 1998), 
and reported faster detection for high-saliency changes. However, this influence of bottom-up 
processes seems to depend on the nature of the task: in free-viewing, preparing for a memory task, 
salient and more complex objects prevail at attracting fixation; but when instructed to search for a 
specific low-saliency object, nontarget saliency has negligible impact (Underwood & Foulsham, 
2006; Underwood, Foulsham, van Loon, Humphreys, & Bloyce, 2006). In fact, one factor that 
tends to override low-level saliency is congruency between objects and background, with 
incongruent changes being detected faster independently of how salient the features of the changing 
object are. 
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Appendix B – Pre-test for used materials 
 
Introduction 
 
To test the effect of congruency between an object and the gender stereotype, it is necessary 
to ensure that the objects are in fact associated differently to either men or women – thus allowing 
their pairing with either gender and creating the congruency and incongruency conditions.  
Gender roles contain behaviors and characteristics that are associated and expected from 
individuals according to their gender – expectations that are passed on between generations and 
are, consequently, culture-dependent (Neculăesei, 2015). These associations apply equally to 
objects of everyday use, with examples that populate all ages and contexts of our lives. For 
instance: it is expected of male children to play with toy cars, while female children are quickly 
associated with dolls; make-up is associated with women, while a tie is expected to be worn by a 
man. 
Studies use a variety of methods to confirm that their stimuli are associated with a 
stereotype. Cheryan, Plaut, Davies, and Steele (2009, p. 1048), for example, asked a group of 33 
students to list objects typically found in the dorm room or office of computer scientists, a science 
major, or a “computer science geek”. Those most frequently mentioned were again rated by 20 
students as to how typical of a computer science major they were, in a 7-item likert-type scale. 
Javadi and Wee (2012) asked participants to categorize images from a pre-existing catalog, shown 
in random order, as associated with the female or male gender. Similarly, Lemm and Dabady 
(2005) selected images from magazines and books and had them categorized as feminine, 
masculine, or gender neutral. Their 40 participants were instructed to judge the associations 
between object and gender as they “believe them to exist in this culture at this time”. 
Demonstrating this association between the stimuli and the categories in focus in each study 
is a vital step to assure task validity. 
As such, this pre-test aims to confirm that a set of objects are strongly associated with each 
of the gender stereotypes (man and woman) in current Portuguese society. 
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Method  
 
Participants 
 A sample of 33 participants was recruited by snowball sampling through e-mail and online 
social networks. Participants were of Portuguese nationality (23 female; 9 male, 1 undisclosed). 
Data on age is as follows: x̄ = 35.55; SD = 13.39 (min 21; max 65).  
 
Materials 
Stimuli were either original photographs of objects, taken for  this study, or images used 
with permission from Javadi and Wee (2012). The digital platform Qualtrics was used to create a 
survey adapted to both desktop and mobile devices. 
 
Procedure 
Participants received their participation link either by e-mail or through their social 
networking sites (e.g., Facebook). Upon clicking the link, the following instructions were shown: 
 
Figure B1. Instructions for the pre-test categorization task. 
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The next screen (Figure B2) listed the 40 objects to be categorized. Under each image, 
participants could choose one option between “Man” or “Woman”. Each type of object was 
represented twice, to account for possible ambiguity (e.g., two different lipsticks were shown). 
A final section collected information regarding participants’ nationality, age, and gender.  
 
 
Results 
 
The following objects were categorized between 100% and 87,88% in the expected 
categories (Figures B3 and B4). 
 
Figure B2. Example of how the task looked when opened 
in mobile devices 
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Male 
 
Female 
 
Figure B3. Objects associated with "Man" 
Figure B4. Objects associated with "Woman" 
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Only one object was removed: a baby carriage was associated with the female gender by 
71.43% of participants (28.57% associated it with “Man”). This was the only instance in which 
two versions of the same object differed in their categorization – a difference in frequency and not 
in gender, as both were still strongly associated with the “Woman” category. As the other exemplar 
of the same object scored higher (associated with the female gender by 88.57% of participants), 
and in order to avoid any confounding, that version was used in our task. 
On average, both categories of objects average similarly in how frequently there were 
associated with the expected gender: male objects registered a 97,9% association the “Man” 
category; female objects registered a 98.2 association with the “Woman” category. 
 
Discussion 
 
All objects were categorized in accordance to expected associations, as well as confirming 
the results obtained by Javadi and Wee (2012) on the images made available by the authors.  
Each object was represented by two exemplars. For each pair (aside from the removed 
object), there is no indication of ambiguity: both exemplars were always associated strongly with 
one gender exclusively.  
Averages for each category (male and female objects) were calculated to establish 
equivalence of associations – in other words, to assure that, for instance, male objects were not 
associated with men at a higher magnitude than female objects were associated with women. Those 
averages indicated a balanced association between gender. 
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Appendix C – Images used (scenes) 
 
The following pages list the images used in the task.  
Each scene is represented in two rows, one per stereotype. Along each row, the first column 
shows the image without the changing object (i.e., the first to be shown in each trial). The second 
and third columns show, respectively, congruency (e.g., man with a male object) and incongruency 
(e.g., woman with male object). 
Labels under each photo identify the scene (e.g., 01) and condition (e.g., MC for “man 
congruent”). For example: 05-WC refers to scene 5, figuring a woman with a congruent female 
object.  
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Appendix D – Test Instructions 
 
Informed consent 
 
 
Instructions 
 
  
Figure D1. Inform consent screen 
Figure D2. Instructions screen 
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Appendix E – Outputs from Statistical Analyses Performed 
 
Output 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Valid N Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev.
Age 72 23.069 18 51 7.817  
 
Frequency table: gender
Category
Count % of all
Cases
Cumulative %
of All
Female
Male
56 77.77778 77.7778
16 22.22222 100.0000
 
 
Output 2: Power analysis to determine sample size (output from G*Power, Faul et al., 
2007) 
 
F tests - ANOVA: Repeated measures, within factors 
Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size  
Input: Effect size f(V) = 0.3333333 
 α err prob = 0.05 
 Power (1-β err prob) = 0.8 
 Number of groups = 1 
 Number of measurements = 2 
 Nonsphericity correction ε = 1 
Output: Noncentrality parameter λ = 8.1111095 
 Critical F = 3.9738970 
 Numerator df = 1.0000000 
 Denominator df = 72.0000000 
 Total sample size = 73 
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RT Analysis 
Outputs 3 through 6 concern the section of the results titled “RT Analysis” (i.e., before 
exploring motivation and perceptive hypothesis, and before controlling for salience). 
 
Output 3: RT Analysis – 2 (woman vs. man) x 2 (female vs. male) x 3 (400ms, 800ms, 
1200ms) repeated measures ANOVA 
 
 
Output 4: RT Analysis – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Threshold 
 
LSD test; variable: Threshold 
  
400ms 800ms 1200ms 
400ms   0.000000 0.000000 
800ms 0.000000   0.470426 
1200ms 0.000000 0.470426   
 
 
 
 
 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance with Effect Sizes and Powers 
Marked differenced are significant at p < .05
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p Partial
eta-squared
Non-centrality Observed
power
(alpha=0.05)
Intercept
Error
Object
Error
Threshold
Error
Stereotype
Error
Obj*Threshold
Error
Obj*Stereotype
Error
Threshold*Stereotype
Error
Obj*Threshold*Stereotype
Error
1.1890E+09 1 1.1890E+09 1002.197 0.00000 0.9338 1002.197 1.0000
8.4234E+07 71 1.1864E+06
4.2413E+06 1 4.2413E+06 10.699 0.00166 0.1310 10.699 0.8973
2.8145E+07 71 3.9640E+05
2.4734E+07 2 1.2367E+07 24.431 0.00000 0.2560 48.861 1.0000
7.1883E+07 142 5.0622E+05
2.9972E+04 1 2.9972E+04 0.059 0.80936 0.0008 0.059 0.0566
3.6290E+07 71 5.1113E+05
2.7114E+06 2 1.3557E+06 2.999 0.05300 0.0405 5.998 0.5743
6.4192E+07 142 4.5205E+05
1.2794E+05 1 1.2794E+05 0.519 0.47352 0.0073 0.519 0.1096
1.7494E+07 71 2.4639E+05
2.9645E+06 2 1.4823E+06 3.743 0.02604 0.0501 7.487 0.6770
5.6227E+07 142 3.9597E+05
1.3759E+04 2 6.8793E+03 0.016 0.98371 0.0002 0.033 0.0524
5.9460E+07 142 4.1873E+05
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Output 5: RT Analysis – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Object gender * Threshold 
 
Output 6: RT Analysis – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Threshold * Stereotype 
 
  
LSD test for Object gender * Threshold; variable RT
Cell No.
Object
gender
Threshold {1}
816.39
{2}
1279.1
{3}
1213.6
{4}
1053.8
{5}
1262.3
{6}
1413.4
1
2
3
4
5
6
Female 400ms 0.0000 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000
Female 800ms 0.0000 0.4093 0.0051 0.8321 0.0924
Female 1200ms 0.0000 0.4093 0.0456 0.5394 0.0128
Male 400ms 0.0032 0.0051 0.0456 0.0094 0.0000
Male 800ms 0.0000 0.8321 0.5394 0.0094 0.0586
Male 1200ms 0.0000 0.0924 0.0128 0.0000 0.0586
LSD test for Stereotype * Threshold; variable RT
Cell No.
Threshold Stereotype {1}
886.95
{2}
983.24
{3}
1347.7
{4}
1193.8
{5}
1267.0
{6}
1359.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
400ms Woman 0.1962 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
400ms Man 0.1962 0.0000 0.0052 0.0002 0.0000
800ms Woman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0398 0.2786 0.8688
800ms Man 0.0001 0.0052 0.0398 0.3251 0.0266
1200ms Woman 0.0000 0.0002 0.2786 0.3251 0.2122
1200ms Man 0.0000 0.0000 0.8688 0.0266 0.2122
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Motivational hypothesis 
The outputs below, from 7 through 12, correspond to the section in the Results titled 
“Motivational hypothesis”. Each output is identified as referring to the female or male sample. 
 
Output 7: Female sample – 2 (woman vs. man) x 2 (female vs. male) x 3 (400ms, 800ms, 
1200ms) repeated measures ANOVA 
 
Output 8: Female sample – Means for Object gender 
 
Output 9: Female sample – Means for Threshold 
 
 
 
 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance with Effect Sizes and Powers 
Marked differences are significant at p < .05
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p Partial
eta-squared
Non-centrality Observed power
(alpha=0.05)
Intercept
Error
Object
Error
Threshold
Error
Stereotype
Error
Object*Threshold
Error
Object*Stereotye
Error
Threshold*Stereotype
Error
Obj*Threshold*Stereotype
Error
865765675 1 865765675 776.3774 0.0000 0.93497 776.3774 1.0000
60217296 54 1115135
4638177 1 4638177 12.1949 0.0010 0.18423 12.1949 0.9291
20538190 54 380337
16969349 2 8484674 19.3183 0.0000 0.26349 38.6367 0.9999
47433949 108 439203
35651 1 35651 0.0843 0.7727 0.00156 0.0843 0.0594
22837729 54 422921
1993315 2 996657 2.2666 0.1086 0.04028 4.5333 0.4524
47488324 108 439707
93457 1 93457 0.3631 0.5493 0.00668 0.3631 0.0910
13898905 54 257387
1451347 2 725673 1.8830 0.1571 0.03370 3.7660 0.3843
41620969 108 385379
58485 2 29242 0.0668 0.9354 0.00124 0.1336 0.0599
47262782 108 437618
Object gender; Unweighted Means 
Cell No.
Object
gender
RT
Mean
RT
Std.Err.
RT
-95.00%
RT
+95.00%
N
1
2
Female 1061.493 40.6702 979.954 1143.032 55
Male 1229.154 53.6439 1121.604 1336.704 55
Threshold; Unweighted Means 
Cell No.
Threshold RT
Mean
RT
Std.Err.
RT
-95.00%
RT
+95.00%
N
1
2
3
400ms 922.005 44.9052 831.975 1012.034 55
800ms 1291.090 61.0708 1168.650 1413.529 55
1200ms 1222.876 57.5798 1107.436 1338.317 55
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Output 10: Female sample – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Object gender * Threshold 
 
LSD test for Object gender * Threshold; variable RT
Cell No.
Object
gender
Threshold {1}
782.56
{2}
1282.1
{3}
1119.8
{4}
1061.5
{5}
1300.1
{6}
1325.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
Female 400ms 0.000000 0.000265 0.002325 0.000000 0.000000
Female 800ms 0.000000 0.072380 0.015176 0.840680 0.625004
Female 1200ms 0.000265 0.072380 0.515130 0.046284 0.023098
Male 400ms 0.002325 0.015176 0.515130 0.008781 0.003808
Male 800ms 0.000000 0.840680 0.046284 0.008781 0.773389
Male 1200ms 0.000000 0.625004 0.023098 0.003808 0.773389
 
 
Output 11: Male sample – 2 (woman vs. man) x 2 (female vs. male) x 3 (400ms, 800ms, 
1200ms) repeated measures ANOVA 
 
Output 12: Male sample – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Threshold 
 
LSD test for Threshold; variable RT
Cell No.
Threshold {1}
943.20
{2}
1221.6
{3}
1689.5
1
2
3
400ms 0.049415 0.000006
800ms 0.049415 0.001725
1200ms 0.000006 0.001725  
 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance with Effect Sizes and Powers
Marked differences are significant at p < .05
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p Partial
eta-squared
Non-centrality Observed power
(alpha=0.05)
Intercept
Error
Object gender
Error
Threshold
Error
Stereotupe
Error
Object*Threshold
Error
Object*Stereotype
Error
Threshold*Stereotype
Error
Obj*Threshold*Stereotype
Error
316928554 1 316928554 223.2773 0.000000 0.937048 223.2773 1.000000
21291584 15 1419439
72911 1 72911 0.1562 0.698270 0.010304 0.1562 0.065871
7002966 15 466864
18206771 2 9103386 15.3896 0.000025 0.506410 30.7792 0.998440
17745841 30 591528
217891 1 217891 0.2533 0.622044 0.016609 0.2533 0.075876
12901153 15 860077
2800889 2 1400445 1.8459 0.175367 0.109577 3.6918 0.353973
22760102 30 758670
93972 1 93972 0.3629 0.555910 0.023620 0.3629 0.087260
3884450 15 258963
1924665 2 962332 2.2069 0.127590 0.128258 4.4139 0.414813
13081486 30 436050
278384 2 139192 0.3656 0.696846 0.023792 0.7311 0.103260
11422467 30 380749
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Perceptive hypothesis 
The outputs below, from 13 through 15, correspond to the section in the Results titled 
“Perceptive hypothesis”. 
 
Output 13: Perceptive hypothesis – Results of repeated measures ANOVAS: 12 (scenes) x 
2 (Stereotype), and 12 (scenes) x 2 (Object gender). 
 
 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance with Effect Sizes and Powers
Marked differences are significant at p < .05
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p Partial
eta-squared
Non-centrality Observed power
(alpha=0.05)
Intercept
Error
Scene
Error
Stereotype
Error
Scene*Stereotype
Error
Object
Error
Scene*Object
Error
2.37191E+09 1.0 2.3719E+09 1038.110 0.000000 0.93937 1038.110 1.0000
1.53084E+08 67.0 2.2848E+06
3.51105E+08 11.0 3.1919E+07 31.344 0.000000 0.31872 344.780 1.0000
7.50520E+08 737.0 1.0183E+06
4.75088E+03 1.0 4.7509E+03 0.005 0.945508 0.00007 0.005 0.0505
6.76279E+07 67.0 1.0094E+06
2.73486E+07 11.0 2.4862E+06 3.203 0.000285 0.04563 35.236 0.9927
5.72026E+08 737.0 7.7615E+05
6.80141E+06 1.0 6.8014E+06 8.1679 0.005591 0.10317 8.1679 0.8049
5.91214E+07 71.0 8.3270E+05
3.88312E+07 11.0 3.5301E+06 4.3406 0.000003 0.05761 47.7467 0.9996
6.35168E+08 781.0 8.1328E+05
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Output 14: Perceptive hypothesis – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Scene * Object gender 
  
LSD test for Scene*Object gender; variable RT
Scene Object
gender
{1}
1151.6
{2}
1253.3
{3}
879.87
{4}
1212.6
{5}
625.28
{6}
1342.2
{7}
980.67
{8}
1015.4
{9}
1434.5
{10}
1198.1
{11}
1429.9
{12}
1371.7
{13}
616.53
{14}
1331.1
{15}
572.07
{16}
586.19
{17}
1701.3
{18}
1801.5
{19}
497.59
{20}
576.89
{21}
2171.1
{22}
1994.3
{23}
983.07
{24}
865.96
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1 Female 0.4988 0.0710 0.6851 0.0005 0.2051 0.2558 0.3653 0.0602 0.7572 0.0645 0.1435 0.0004 0.2327 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.2626 0.0578
1 Male 0.4988 0.0132 0.7864 0.0000 0.5543 0.0701 0.1139 0.2284 0.7134 0.2405 0.4312 0.0000 0.6048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0726 0.0101
2 Female 0.0710 0.0132 0.0272 0.0907 0.0022 0.5027 0.3674 0.0002 0.0346 0.0003 0.0011 0.0802 0.0028 0.0409 0.0511 0.0000 0.0000 0.0112 0.0442 0.0000 0.0000 0.4926 0.9263
2 Male 0.6851 0.7864 0.0272 0.0001 0.3886 0.1233 0.1901 0.1402 0.9232 0.1487 0.2901 0.0001 0.4305 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1272 0.0214
3 Female 0.0005 0.0000 0.0907 0.0001 0.0000 0.0183 0.0096 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.9536 0.0000 0.7234 0.7949 0.0000 0.0000 0.3958 0.7475 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.1097
3 Male 0.2051 0.5543 0.0022 0.3886 0.0000 0.0164 0.0300 0.5396 0.3378 0.5600 0.8447 0.0000 0.9411 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0016
4 Female 0.2558 0.0701 0.5027 0.1233 0.0183 0.0164 0.8172 0.0026 0.1485 0.0029 0.0095 0.0156 0.0200 0.0067 0.0088 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 0.9873 0.4456
4 Male 0.3653 0.1139 0.3674 0.1901 0.0096 0.0300 0.8172 0.0054 0.2247 0.0060 0.0180 0.0081 0.0360 0.0033 0.0044 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.8296 0.3203
5 Female 0.0602 0.2284 0.0002 0.1402 0.0000 0.5396 0.0026 0.0054 0.1162 0.9755 0.6762 0.0000 0.4918 0.0000 0.0000 0.0762 0.0148 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0028 0.0002
5 Male 0.7572 0.7134 0.0346 0.9232 0.0001 0.3378 0.1485 0.2247 0.1162 0.1234 0.2485 0.0001 0.3764 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1530 0.0274
6 Female 0.0645 0.2405 0.0003 0.1487 0.0000 0.5600 0.0029 0.0060 0.9755 0.1234 0.6987 0.0000 0.5113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0713 0.0136 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0030 0.0002
6 Male 0.1435 0.4312 0.0011 0.2901 0.0000 0.8447 0.0095 0.0180 0.6762 0.2485 0.6987 0.0000 0.7873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0286 0.0044 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0099 0.0008
7 Female 0.0004 0.0000 0.0802 0.0001 0.9536 0.0000 0.0156 0.0081 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7674 0.8401 0.0000 0.0000 0.4290 0.7920 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150 0.0974
7 Male 0.2327 0.6048 0.0028 0.4305 0.0000 0.9411 0.0200 0.0360 0.4918 0.3764 0.5113 0.7873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0140 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0208 0.0020
8 Female 0.0001 0.0000 0.0409 0.0000 0.7234 0.0000 0.0067 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7674 0.0000 0.9252 0.0000 0.0000 0.6204 0.9744 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 0.0509
8 Male 0.0002 0.0000 0.0511 0.0000 0.7949 0.0000 0.0088 0.0044 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.8401 0.0000 0.9252 0.0000 0.0000 0.5557 0.9506 0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.0631
9 Female 0.0003 0.0030 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0171 0.0000 0.0000 0.0762 0.0009 0.0713 0.0286 0.0000 0.0140 0.0000 0.0000 0.5055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0516 0.0000 0.0000
9 Male 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0148 0.0001 0.0136 0.0044 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.5055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0141 0.1998 0.0000 0.0000
10 Female 0.0000 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0.3958 0.0000 0.0014 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4290 0.0000 0.6204 0.5557 0.0000 0.0000 0.5979 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0145
10 Male 0.0001 0.0000 0.0442 0.0000 0.7475 0.0000 0.0074 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7920 0.0000 0.9744 0.9506 0.0000 0.0000 0.5979 0.0000 0.0000 0.0070 0.0548
11 Female 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.2399 0.0000 0.0000
11 Male 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0516 0.1998 0.0000 0.0000 0.2399 0.0000 0.0000
12 Female 0.2626 0.0726 0.4926 0.1272 0.0175 0.0171 0.9873 0.8296 0.0028 0.1530 0.0030 0.0099 0.0150 0.0208 0.0064 0.0084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.4361
12 Male 0.0578 0.0101 0.9263 0.0214 0.1097 0.0016 0.4456 0.3203 0.0002 0.0274 0.0002 0.0008 0.0974 0.0020 0.0509 0.0631 0.0000 0.0000 0.0145 0.0548 0.0000 0.0000 0.4361
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Output 15: Perceptive hypothesis – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Scene * Stereotype 
 
 
 
LSD test for Scene * Stereotype; variable RT
Scene Stereot
ype
{1}
1130.2
{2}
1351.3
{3}
1135.7
{4}
1016.1
{5}
832.10
{6}
1208.0
{7}
920.65
{8}
1129.2
{9}
1292.9
{10}
1441.3
{11}
1541.8
{12}
1493.9
{13}
1015.7
{14}
1008.8
{15}
612.47
{16}
587.35
{17}
1828.4
{18}
1964.5
{19}
570.31
{20}
540.06
{21}
2560.3
{22}
1853.6
{23}
1005.7
{24}
893.16
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1 Female 0.1439 0.9712 0.4501 0.0488 0.6068 0.1658 0.9947 0.2820 0.0399 0.0066 0.0163 0.4486 0.4217 0.0006 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.4102 0.1171
1 Male 0.1439 0.1540 0.0268 0.0006 0.3434 0.0045 0.1421 0.6993 0.5515 0.2077 0.3455 0.0266 0.0237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0225 0.0025
2 Female 0.9712 0.1540 0.4288 0.0449 0.6322 0.1551 0.9659 0.2984 0.0435 0.0074 0.0180 0.4273 0.4012 0.0006 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.3900 0.1089
2 Male 0.4501 0.0268 0.4288 0.2238 0.2043 0.5280 0.4541 0.0673 0.0050 0.0005 0.0016 0.9980 0.9616 0.0077 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.9455 0.4163
3 Female 0.0488 0.0006 0.0449 0.2238 0.0131 0.5580 0.0496 0.0024 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.2248 0.2427 0.1465 0.1057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0836 0.0536 0.0000 0.0000 0.2509 0.6862
3 Male 0.6068 0.3434 0.6322 0.2043 0.0131 0.0576 0.6022 0.5745 0.1230 0.0275 0.0589 0.2034 0.1877 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1810 0.0375
4 Female 0.1658 0.0045 0.1551 0.5280 0.5580 0.0576 0.1679 0.0140 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.5296 0.5599 0.0417 0.0277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0207 0.0120 0.0000 0.0000 0.5736 0.8557
4 Male 0.9947 0.1421 0.9659 0.4541 0.0496 0.6022 0.1679 0.2790 0.0392 0.0065 0.0160 0.4526 0.4256 0.0007 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.4140 0.1186
5 Female 0.2820 0.6993 0.2984 0.0673 0.0024 0.5745 0.0140 0.2790 0.3263 0.0999 0.1838 0.0669 0.0604 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0577 0.0083
5 Male 0.0399 0.5515 0.0435 0.0050 0.0001 0.1230 0.0006 0.0392 0.3263 0.5061 0.7278 0.0050 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0106 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 0.0041 0.0003
6 Female 0.0066 0.2077 0.0074 0.0005 0.0000 0.0275 0.0000 0.0065 0.0999 0.5061 0.7513 0.0005 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0582 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0394 0.0004 0.0000
6 Male 0.0163 0.3455 0.0180 0.0016 0.0000 0.0589 0.0002 0.0160 0.1838 0.7278 0.7513 0.0016 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0271 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0013 0.0001
7 Female 0.4486 0.0266 0.4273 0.9980 0.2248 0.2034 0.5296 0.4526 0.0669 0.0050 0.0005 0.0016 0.9636 0.0078 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.9475 0.4177
7 Male 0.4217 0.0237 0.4012 0.9616 0.2427 0.1877 0.5599 0.4256 0.0604 0.0043 0.0004 0.0014 0.9636 0.0089 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.9839 0.4444
8 Female 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 0.0077 0.1465 0.0001 0.0417 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0078 0.0089 0.8680 0.0000 0.0000 0.7803 0.6319 0.0000 0.0000 0.0094 0.0636
8 Male 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0047 0.1057 0.0000 0.0277 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0054 0.8680 0.0000 0.0000 0.9102 0.7544 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0433
9 Female 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0106 0.0582 0.0271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3680 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8674 0.0000 0.0000
9 Male 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0053 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3680 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.4634 0.0000 0.0000
10 Female 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0033 0.0836 0.0000 0.0207 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0038 0.7803 0.9102 0.0000 0.0000 0.8414 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.0329
10 Male 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0017 0.0536 0.0000 0.0120 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0020 0.6319 0.7544 0.0000 0.0000 0.8414 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0197
11 Female 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
11 Male 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0065 0.0394 0.0175 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8674 0.4634 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
12 Female 0.4102 0.0225 0.3900 0.9455 0.2509 0.1810 0.5736 0.4140 0.0577 0.0041 0.0004 0.0013 0.9475 0.9839 0.0094 0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.4565
12 Male 0.1171 0.0025 0.1089 0.4163 0.6862 0.0375 0.8557 0.1186 0.0083 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.4177 0.4444 0.0636 0.0433 0.0000 0.0000 0.0329 0.0197 0.0000 0.0000 0.4565
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Re-testing the hypothesis 
The outputs below, from 16 and 17, correspond to the section in the Results titled “Re-
testing the hypothesis controlling for salience differences”. These analyses were conducted after 
removal of scenes 2, 3, 7, and 11 – as these were found to contain interfering saliency issues. 
 
Output 16: Re-test – 2 (woman vs. man) x 2 (female vs. male) x 3 (400ms, 800ms, 1200ms) 
repeated measures ANOVA 
 
Output 17: Re-test – Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for Threshold 
 
 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance with Effect Sizes and Powers
Marked differences are significant at p < .05
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p Partial
eta-squared
Non-centrality Observed power
(alpha=0.05)
Intercept
Error
Stereotype
Error
Object gender
Error
Threshold
Error
Stereotype*Object
Error
Stereotype*Threshold
Error
Object*Threshold
Error
Stereotype*Obj*Threshold
Error
1.0366E+09 1 1.0366E+09 1008.665 0.00000 0.9360 1008.665 1.0000
7.0909E+07 69 1.0277E+06
7.4997E+05 1 7.4997E+05 2.139 0.14813 0.0301 2.139 0.3026
2.4192E+07 69 3.5061E+05
7.0084E+03 1 7.0084E+03 0.015 0.90299 0.0002 0.015 0.0517
3.2312E+07 69 4.6829E+05
4.0524E+07 2 2.0262E+07 37.633 0.00000 0.3529 75.266 1.0000
7.4300E+07 138 5.3841E+05
1.5406E+04 1 1.5406E+04 0.037 0.84853 0.0005 0.037 0.0541
2.8923E+07 69 4.1918E+05
7.9010E+05 2 3.9505E+05 0.861 0.42502 0.0123 1.722 0.1957
6.3323E+07 138 4.5886E+05
1.5812E+06 2 7.9062E+05 1.956 0.14530 0.0276 3.912 0.3996
5.5775E+07 138 4.0417E+05
5.2278E+05 2 2.6139E+05 0.717 0.49010 0.0103 1.434 0.1693
5.0320E+07 138 3.6463E+05
LSD test for Threshold; variable RT
Marked differences are significant at p < .05
Cell No.
Threshold {1}
929.23
{2}
983.46
{3}
1419.9
1
2
3
400ms 0.3834 0.0000
800ms 0.3834 0.0000
1200ms 0.0000 0.0000
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Output 18: Pearson’s correlation analysis (between used Threshold and observed RTs) for 
all 8  
studies (23 observations). 
 
Output 19: Pearson’s correlation analysis (between Threshold and observed RTs) after 
removing observations from Vierck and Kiesel (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations
Marked correlations are significant at p < .05
N=23 (Casewise deletion of missing data)
Variable Means Std.Dev. Threshold RTs
Threshold
RTs
618.261 340.356 1.0000 0.8600
5541.087 4112.203 0.8600 1.0000
Correlations
Marked correlations are significant at p < .05000
N=17 (Casewise deletion of missing data)
Variable Means Std.Dev. Threshold RTs
Threshold
RTs
497.647 102.135 1.0000 0.3278
3442.294 1174.865 0.3278 1.0000
